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ABSTRACT 
           Using data from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management, this study analyzes how 
financial structure impacts the profitability of grain and livestock farms in Illinois from 1996 to 
2009. Various datasets were assembled to sort farms into pure grain farms, and then sub-sample 
datasets for the periods 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009. After filtering the data with 
certain criteria, three models were constructed to measure three types of profitability for pure 
grain farms. These models show there is statistical evidence to suggest that the debt-to-asset 
ratio, farm size, land tenure, and equipment costs have an impact on explaining the profitability 
levels of production agricultural entities. The three models are then used to contrast the statistical 
significance of the specific variables, which are used to derive the profitability measures. 
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1     INTRODUCTION 
 
     The main focus of this thesis is to analyze the effects of capital structure on profitability for 
pure grain farms in Illinois. Pure grain farms are those whose main focus is corn and soybean 
production. These are farms that have 90% or more of acres in corn and soybeans production, 
less than 10% of revenue coming from livestock production, less than 40% of the crop output fed 
to livestock, and less than 10% of revenue coming from custom farming.  The dataset used for 
this study comes from Illinois Farm Business Farm Management and spans 1996-2009. This 
dataset is comprised of farm specific figures taken from yearly financial statements. The factors 
that affect capital structure are debt position, tenure, and machinery ownerships and are believed 
to explain the variation in profitability.  
     The three profitability measures analyzed are net farm income per acre, return on assets, and 
return on equity. Net farm income per acre gives a measure in dollar amounts that can easily be 
compared across farms. Return on assets shows farm returns in relation to the amount of assets 
held by each operation. Return on equity shows the farm returns in relation to the owned portion 
of the operation. Each of these measures provides unique insight to the operator to base 
management decisions. The expectations and implications of each are discussed later in the 
thesis. Regression analysis as well as means analysis is performed to analyze the relationships 
between each of these factors and the different profit measures. Furthermore, these relationships 
are analyzed within three time periods that are associated with dissimilar profitability periods. 
The significance, magnitude, and sign of the variables in each time period gives evidence of 
fundamental changes in these relationships throughout recent time periods. This chapter 
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discusses more of the motivation of this study as well as the goals and objectives. After the goals 
and objectives, this chapter concludes with a brief outline of the thesis.  
1.1 Motivation  
     Due to the important impacts on profitability and risk, capital structure has been the focus of 
many researchers for decades but seems to get more popular during drastic changes in 
agriculture. During the 1980’s when land prices dropped, researchers looked at ways to increase 
profitability in an attempt to regain lost equity. Garcia et al. conducted research during this time 
period to analyze the affects of farm size and tenure on economic efficiency. Ellinger and Barry 
(1987) also looked at tenure position’s effects on farm profitability and solvency in Illinois. In 
the more recent years, farms have become increasingly profitable even though their costs have 
risen significantly. With concerns over falling prices many operators have looked at risk 
management through financial structure to mitigate the risks of input prices. This research will 
continue this previous research with more emphasis on capital structure.   
     While capital structure has always been important, there are new methods that allow us to 
more accurately calculate the relationships between profitability and financial structure. Many of 
the previous researchers used a Cobb-Douglas profit function (Garcia et al. 1980) or means 
analysis (Ellinger and Barry 1987, Sonka et al. 1989, and Plumley and Hornbaker 1991).  And 
many researchers supplemented their means analysis with models using Ordinary Least Squares 
as an estimator to explain the variation in measures of profitability. While these analyses provide 
important information, more accurate results can now be achieved. Namely, Fixed Effects 
estimators can be used to allow for heterogeneity across groups (farms) and variation across 
time. Furthermore, the software (STATA) utilized in this analysis, now provides a more 
consistent Fixed Effects Model in the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. This is 
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accomplished through the use of clustered standard errors instead of traditional robust standard 
errors, which is discussed in more depth in Chapter 6. Improved methods should increase the 
accuracy of the ensuing research.  
    The time period analyzed here also provides another motivation for this study. While other 
researchers have analyzed the FBFM dataset in the past (mainly in 1980s through early 1990s) it 
has not been analyzed recently. There have been significant changes in the commodity prices, 
yields, government programs, and risk management tools available within the time period 
analyzed here (1996-2009). This more recent analysis of this dataset is expected to add to 
existing body of knowledge as well look for fundamental changes. The next section will further 
discuss the goals and objectives of this thesis.  
1.2 Goals and Objectives  
     As stated before, this analysis is focused on the capital structure of farms and how it 
contributes to different profitability measures. Hence, the independent variables in each of these 
models are expected to, or have previously explained, some of the variation in profitability. The 
first objective of this thesis is to analyze the effects of tenure position on the three measures of 
profitability. Tenure has been documented as being one of the main determinants to financial 
structure of the farm. For these pure grain farms tenure refers to the portion of land that is 
owned. On the other hand, the operator could enter into a rental agreement to operate land owned 
by another person. These rental agreements can come in the form of cash renting, a flat fee paid 
per acre, or share leasing, whereby all input costs are split by the owner and operator.  
     The second objective of this thesis is to analyze the effects of the debt position of the farm on 
profitability. To accomplish this, the debt-to-asset ratio is analyzed. This ratio shows the amount 
of debt held in relation to the value of all assets. One minus this ratio indicates the relative 
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amount of equity the farm operates on. The interactions of this variable and profits should give 
operators important insight to make management decisions as to whether to take on more debt 
and vice versa.  
     The third objective is to analyze machinery ownership and how it affects profit measures. 
Previous research by Mishra et al. (1999) shows that the most efficient way of becoming more 
profitable is to control fixed and variable costs. This analysis regresses the total power costs per 
acre on each return measure. While it is expected that this variable is significant, the composition 
of these costs is of interest. Specifically, how much of these power costs go toward leasing 
machinery or hiring out duties to outside operators is of interest. The objective is to figure if it is 
more beneficial financially to buy equipment and have the operator/hired labor perform the 
duties or to hire out the work and/or lease machinery. This has implications in terms of where the 
operator decides to expend time and human capital (management) that could potentially be used 
for other things.   
     The last objective is focused on analyzing changes in both the dependent variables (profit 
measures) and the independent variables (structure and control) throughout time. To perform this 
analysis the entire dataset is broken down into three 3-year periods. The three periods correspond 
to a depressed pricing period from 1998-2000, a “normal” pre-ethanol pricing period from 2002-
2004, and a post-ethanol pricing period from 2007-2009. The objective here is to see if these 
independent variables, that are hypothesized to be the main drivers of profit, change significance, 
magnitude, or sign. It is expected that the magnitudes steadily increase with each time period as 
progressively better prices are received by farms. However, it is unknown if the proportions of 
the relationships stay the same throughout the different time periods.  An outline of the rest of 
the thesis follows by explaining the components of each subsequent chapter.   
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1.3 Thesis Summary  
     There are six additional chapters remaining in this text. Chapter 2 contains a literature review 
which focuses on previous research similar to this study. This chapter gives background into the 
farm profitability and different methods used. Much of the knowledge needed to form educated 
expectations comes from reading and analyzing these past studies as well as knowledge of 
finance and microeconomic principals. This chapter will contain summaries of these analyses 
which state who conducted the research, what data was used, the methods used, conclusions, and 
any implications resulting from the analysis.  
     Chapter 3 discusses the dataset utilized in this study. Furthermore, the motivation to use the 
FBFM data is presented as well as the benefits of doing so. Also discussed in Chapter 3 is the 
creation of the dataset used. Here, the criteria imposed and the reasons for doing so are 
explained. This section also discusses the amount of farms that are being sorted out as a result of 
imposing these criteria. The creation of the pooled dataset that contains only pure grain farms is 
discussed as well as the creation of the three subsamples associated with the three-year averages 
of farms. Also discussed in Chapter 3 are the assumptions made to conduct this analysis.  
     Chapter 4 presents the methods used within the entire time period as well as in the three-year 
time periods. Here, the decisions for choosing the specific dependent variables are explained as 
well as exactly what is being measured by each variable. Next, the chapter explains the 
independent variables used. These independent variables are broken down into structural 
variables and control variables. The structure variables are the focus of the study and are 
associated with the financial structure of the farms. The control variables measure factors that are 
known to affect farm profitability and must be included to prevent an omitted variable bias. As 
each of these variables is explained, the expectations of their significance, magnitude, and sign 
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are discussed for each of the three profitability measures. The expectations will also be compared 
to previous research from Chapter 2 in this section.   
     Chapter 5 presents summary statistics and other data analysis. The chapter begins with a 
discussion of both the dependent and independent variables and how each is calculated. Then 
summary statistics are presented for the entire dataset spanning 1996-2009. Next, a correlation 
matrix shows the relationships between the variables and whether they have a positive or 
negative relationship, which could cause problems later in the regression analysis. Also 
discussed in Chapter 5 are the trends of variable averages by year. This gives additional 
motivation for forming the three-year averages and analyzing them separate. Chapter 5 also 
provides a means analysis of the variables within grouping of other independent variables. This 
has been popular in previous research and allows an in-depth look at the dataset.  
     Chapter 6 provides results for the regression analysis for the three profit measures within the 
dataset spanning 1996-2009 as well as the subsamples spanning 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 
2007-2009. This chapter also discusses tests that are ran to insure data integrity and 
appropriateness of each model used. The econometric approaches are also explained for the 
pooled dataset and the three-year time period models.  The results are then presented to explain 
the significance and effect on each profitability measure. The results are then compared to the 
expectations and results from previous studies.  
     Chapter 7 provides a conclusion to the thesis. The thesis objectives are presented along with 
the methods used to achieve them. Then the results are summarized and conclusions are drawn. 
The implications of these results are then presented in an applied sense. This ties that research to 
farm level and states what operators should take away from this analysis. Then ideas for further 
research are discussed. While this analysis explains a significant portion of profitability, there are 
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things that could improve the robustness of the model, conceptually. Also discussed are the 
limitations of this analysis. While a quality dataset is utilized, Illinois has relatively distinct 
agricultural demographics. This analysis could be expanded geographically, in addition to 
analyzing a greater sample of commodities.   
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2     LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
     This chapter summarizes the existing body of knowledge that is devoted to explaining the 
factors that affect farm returns. This has been a much researched topic in the past, when prices 
were depressed and operators were forced to be cognoscente in their financial structure and 
management decisions. It is now resurfacing as competition for land and rental agreements are 
becoming fierce due to the highly prosperous recent years in grain focused production 
agriculture. Also, the recent increase of input prices such as fertilizer, fuel, seed, and equipment 
has spurred operators to focus on cost control, input price risk mitigation, and financial structure. 
Hence, this chapter outlines what has been done in the past to motivate further analysis of farm 
profitability.  
2.1 Previous Work  
     There has been a wide array of research devoted to the topic of farm profitability and how to 
assess a farm’s success. In 1980, Garcia, Sonka, and Yoo set out to determine how the size of 
operation and ownership of the land farmed affect the profitability of farming operations. The 
analysis made use of data from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) from 1977 
and consisted of 311 Illinois cash grain farms. Three models were constructed: a profit function 
and two input demand functions (labor demand and cash expenditure demand). These functions 
were estimated separately and then the error terms were checked for heteroscedasticity, in 
addition to testing for equality of the coefficient between the models. The research implies there 
are constant returns to scale, meaning size does not attribute significant changes in economic 
efficiency (Garcia, Sonka and Yoo 1982, 121). Furthermore, the analysis indicates that while the 
size of the farm is not a major factor for farm profitability, tenure is. Tenure indicates the 
ownership of the farm land and shows the portion of the land owned versus rented.  They 
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concluded that maximizing short-run profit is inversely related to owning land in which you 
operate, implying that rental agreements lead to higher returns.  
     Ali and Johnson conducted research on moderate-sized farms in North Dakota in 1987 to 
examine factors that affect their economic success. Specifically, they wanted to identify and 
measure factors that influence returns to labor and management. To conduct this research, data 
from the North Dakota Vocational Agricultural Farm Business Management Education Program 
was used. This dataset was comprised of approximately 300 farms with complete record 
summaries from 1982 to 1984.   These records included summaries from crop, beef, and dairy 
farms where there was sufficient need for full-time employees.  Returns to labor and 
management per full-time operator could then be analyzed due to the common criteria between 
farms. Ali and Johnson used multiple stepwise regressions to identify and measure the affects of 
size, cost control, marketing efficiency, production efficiency, and labor efficiency on labor and 
management returns per full-time operator. The results indicate that all of these factors 
significantly impacted labor returns. Specifically, tillable acres per worker had a significant 
positive effect on labor returns as did crop yields, crop intensity index (measures crop selection 
and summer fallow use on a farm as compared to the area average), and prices received. Hence, 
an increase in the crop intensity index, crop yields, or prices received resulted in higher labor and 
management returns. On the other hand, total assets per acre and machinery expenses per acre 
had a significant negative effect on labor returns. These resulting relationships with machinery 
expenses and total assets agree with predicted influences, as these two variables are associated 
with the cost component of profit. 
     Simulation models that would forecast responses to different financial stresses became 
popular in the mid to late 1980’s. Schnitkey, Barry, and Ellinger used the Farm Financial 
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Simulation Model (FFSM) to conduct research on highly leveraged cash grain farms in Illinois. 
“FFSM is a tool for analyzing the financial consequences of various managerial strategies and 
policy options that may be implemented in responding to farm financial stress” (Schnitkey, Barry 
and Ellinger 1987, 203).  This model made use of numerical parameters derived from the Illinois 
FBFM System, the St. Louis Federal Land Bank Data Base, and other studies at the University of 
Missouri and Iowa State University. This empirical basis is used to derive the financial 
simulation analysis in the following study by Ellinger and Barry.  
     In 1987, Ellinger and Barry evaluated the effects of land tenure on various financial 
performance measures. Furthermore, the relationship between land tenure and farm size was also 
analyzed. They conducted this research using Illinois FBFM records as well as loan records from 
the St. Louis Farm Credit Banks (FCB). The FBFM dataset contained data from 1972, 1976, and 
1980 through 1985 and “includes about one in every five Illinois farms over 500 acres” (Ellinger 
and Barry 1987, 107).  Ellinger and Barry analyzed the mean values of the solvency and 
profitability measures and classified them by the tenure of the farmland. This tenure 
classification ranged from pure tenant, or renting all acres, to full owner in percentage terms of 
land owned. They found that tenure varies across farm size, so they put together two regression 
models. The first model was used to explain the debt-to-asset ratio (D/A) and the other, return on 
assets. The independent variables in these models were land tenure, number of acres operated, 
and an interaction term between tenure and number of acres. The results indicate that tenure and 
number of acres were statistically significant in explaining the D/A and return on asset ratios. 
Furthermore, the Tukey-Kramer method was used to test the significance of the means of the 
D/A ratio and return on asset between the tenure classes. The results indicated that there were 
significant differences in the return on assets between tenure classes in larger size farms. As 
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expected, the lower tenure classification groups had significantly higher return on assets. This is 
most likely due to fewer owned assets to divide returns by. On the other hand, there were 
significant differences with the D/A ratios but these differences occurred in farms of 500 acres or 
less. The farms with fewer than 500 acres had significantly lower D/A ratios than larger farms.  
     Further analysis by Ellinger and Barry used the Farm Credit Bank data which includes all new 
loans made in Illinois for 1976 and 1980 through 1984.  One criterion for inclusion in this dataset 
was that the farms had to be over 250 acres.  The same analysis previously used by Ellinger et al.  
with the FBFM data was applied to this dataset. Similar results were found, such as the average 
farm size decreased as the percentage of land owned increased. Also, “similar to the FBFM data, 
the D/A ratio declines with increases in the ratio of land owned to total land operated” (Ellinger 
114). Ellinger and Barry conclude that as tenancy increases, the returns on assets, return on 
equity, and the D/A ratio also increase. Furthermore, they showed through simulation that these 
relationships between tenure and financial performance hold when controlling for farm size. 
Hence, when analyzing the performance of a farm, as much emphasis needs to be put on tenure 
position as on the D/A ratio.      
    In 1989, Sonka, Hornbaker, and Hudson set out to determine if there were significant 
differences in the financial performance due to managerial decisions. In addition, they wanted to 
look at the variability of the finances from year to year and determine if these changes could be 
explained by observable factors. This research was conducted using FBFM records for a sample 
of 179 cash grain farms from 1976 to 1983. The study used management returns as the 
performance measure and grouped the farms in quartiles based on their eight-year averages. 
Then the group averages for the top and bottom quartiles were then analyzed using a logit model.  
The analysis shows significant differences in the management returns per acre between the 
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period 1976-79 and 1980-83 due to economic and farm sector conditions. Specifically, the latter 
time period saw considerable decreases in land prices combined with high interest rates and low 
grain prices.  Therefore, the logit model was used to assess the relationship between these two 
time periods. One of the most notable results in the 1980-83 time period is that corn prices 
received are not significant in both the bottom and top performing quartiles while soybean price 
received is only significant in the bottom performing quartile. This can be explained by the 
depressed prices during that time period where increased marketing efficiency did not yield a 
great increase in financial performance.  
     Furthermore, the variability of performance is analyzed to see if farms were persistent in 
outperforming or underperforming their peers. Sonka et al. (1998) found considerable variability 
as 128 of the 179 producers ranked in the top quartile for management returns in at least one of 
the eight years analyzed. On the other hand, 121 of the 179 producers ranked in the bottom 
quartile in a least one of the eight years. Hence, this year-to-year variability among performance, 
as well as the logit analysis, shows that characteristics such as farm size and crop rotation are not 
predictive measures in managerial performance as they were previously believed to be. They 
conclude that further research is needed to quantitatively describe the long-term financial success 
of farms.  
     Plumley and Hornbaker (1991) analyzed four different management performance measures in 
order to set ideal benchmark ratios for farmers to achieve. The objective of the research is to first 
determine the most successful firms and then define a financial structure that enables farmers to 
use a guideline for their decision making. Illinois FBFM data from 1985 through 1988 was used 
for the study, consisting of 123 farms which were certified useable for comparative analysis and 
met the criteria set forth to obtain pure grain focused entities. The four measures used to conduct 
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the second degree stochastic dominance (SDSD) analysis are net farm income per tillable acre, 
management returns per tillable acre, management returns per dollar of farm equity, and net farm 
income per dollar of farm equity. SDSD was used to sort the farms into three level of 
performance: successful, less successful, and least successful.  Once these farms were sorted into 
the three levels of success, mean analysis is performed in order to define optimal ratios. The 
most significant result of the analysis lies in the differences in tenure position between the most 
successful and least successful groups. More specifically, the most successful operations only 
own 5% of the land controlled while the least successful farms own over 50%. (Plumley and 
Hornbaker 1991) Furthermore, Plumley and Hornbaker note that using performance measures 
such as management returns per dollar of equity is more appropriate as a long-term success 
measure, as it accounts for the opportunity cost of labor and capital; whereas, net farm income 
alone does not.  
     In 1996, Dobbs and Smolik conducted further research on the topic of long-term financial 
success through the use of paired comparisons. They compared a “Conventional” and 
“Alternative” farm in east central South Dakota over an eight year period from 1985-1992. The 
“Conventional” farm consists of a corn-soybean crop rotation where purchased synthetic 
chemical inputs are used. The “Alternative” farm was free from the use of synthetic chemical 
and used an alfalfa-alfalfa-soybeans-corn crop rotation. Analysis was then performed on the net 
income, which accounts for all costs except management costs. Dobbs and Smolik found that the 
“Conventional” farm is more profitable than the “Alternative” farm especially during the first 
four years of the study. This competitive advantage in the first four years can be attributed in part 
to the high amount of government payments received by conventional farmers relative to 
alternative farmers. The remainder of the increased profitability can be attributed to a higher 
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proportion of more profitable crops such as corn and soybeans. Furthermore, the conventional 
farming methods led to higher yields on those crops which increased net income compared to the 
alternative farm. Again, it is important to note that only one measure of financial performance 
was used in this analysis and that it does not account for returns to management. The difference 
in management directives between the two styles of farming could explain much of the 
difference in returns.    
    In 1997, Purdy, Langemeier, and Featherstone examined the effects of risk and level of 
specialization on mean financial performance. To conduct this research, Kansas Farm 
Management Association’s data were utilized by analyzing 320 farms from 1985 through 1994.  
These 320 farms represented about 12% of the farms from the continuous dataset, which is 
composed of income, expense, and balance sheet information. This study analyzed mean and 
variance of returns to farm in a recursive system estimated using three stage least squares. Here, 
mean return on equity (MROE) is a function of variance of the return on equity (VROE), age of 
operator, percentage of total acres owned, operating expense ratio, depreciation expense ratio, 
D/A ratio, specialization, total number of acres operated. VROE is a function age of operator, 
D/A ratio, specialization, percentage of gross farm income derived from government payments, 
number of acres operated, and the Kansas Farm Management Association region where the farm 
is located. Three stage least squares was used to estimate coefficients whereby elasticities were 
then derived. Purdy et al. found that age of operator, percentage of acres owned, financial 
efficiency, and leverage had an inverse relationship to returns. On the other hand, farm size had a 
positive effect on returns. They also found that specializing in livestock reduces the variance of 
returns as well as increasing mean financial performance (with the exception of beef production 
reducing mean returns). (Purdy, Langemeier and Featherstone 1997) Furthermore, specialization 
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in grain production increases the variance of the returns while also increasing the mean of those 
returns. This relationship is expected, whereby more risk tends to achieve higher returns.  
     Mishra, El-Osta, and Steele investigated the factors affecting profitability of limited resource 
and other small farms in 1999. Data were used from the 1996 USDA “Agricultural Resource 
Management Study” (ARMS) survey. This is a national survey conducted by the Economic 
Research Service (ERS) and National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) whereby financial, 
operating, management, and the well-being of the farm operator’s household data is collected. 
(Mishra, El-Osta and Steele 1999) This sample data is then extrapolated by a survey expansion 
factor to give a portrayal of the entire farming population. Here, ordinary least squares would 
produce biased estimates, therefore, a weighted multiple linear regression model is used, given 
the sample selection process.  Furthermore, a delete-a-group jackknife method is used as a 
variance estimator to account for varying weight adjustments across the survey. This study 
included a net farm income model and an operators’ returns to labor and management model 
which were regressed against age, age squared, D/A ratio, soil productivity, value of agriculture 
production, variable costs, fixed costs, and the degree of diversification. In addition, the two 
models were regressed against dummy variables for whether the operation was set up as a sole 
proprietorship, whether the operator kept a record book of finances, and whether the farm 
utilized available crop insurance.  As expected, the results indicate the most efficient way of 
becoming more profitable is to control fixed and variable costs. Mishra et al. also found that 
operations utilizing crop and livestock insurance were much more likely to be successful 
financially. As previous research shows, it benefits small farms to have a lower D/A ratio. 
Therefore, renting land to operate on and leasing equipment increases the profitability of limited 
resource and other small farms across the nation.  
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      Later the same year Mishra, El-Osta, and Johnson published another study that analyzed 
factors contributing to the success of cash grain farms. This research had a more broad scope in 
terms of farm size but does not include livestock operations. Again, the study utilizes 
Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS), this time from the 1994 survey. This is an 
annual national survey with the sample being drawn from a stratified list and area frame. The 
study analyzes three measures of financial success using a logit regression. These three measures 
are: net farm income per dollar of assets (MNFRDOA), operators’ return to labor and 
management (OLMI), and operators’ management income (OMI). The data was then sorted into 
two groups composed of successful farm firms, or the top one-fourth, and less successful farms, 
whose performance was in the bottom three-fourths of the sample. The differences in the 
characteristics between the groups were then analyzed using a logistic regression. The results 
measure the likelihood that a farm is successfully given its management and farm structure. 
Mishra et al. found that this success depends primarily on control of variable costs of production, 
machinery costs, and farm ownership. (Mishra, El-Osta and Johnson 1999) It was also found that 
leasing or renting land as well as keeping good financial records contribute to a farm’s success. 
Furthermore, the timing of new technology adoption was shown to have a significant effect on a 
farm’s performance. Here, it was most beneficial to adopt the technology after someone else has 
tried it in the county but before the majority of farmers adopt it. This benefit could be due to 
companies offering introductory pricing at the launch of various products and technologies until 
there is widespread agreement of a financial benefit.  
     Since the decomposition of the financial statements to analyze returns is a fundamental 
process, many researchers have chosen to further break down returns. One such method is 
applying the DuPont Method to decompose return on equity (ROE) into asset efficiency, profit 
  
17 
 
margin, and financial leverage. In 2008, Mishra, Harris, Erickson, and Hallahan took this 
approach another step further to assess how farm specialization and vertical integration affect 
this form of profitability. Data from 1996-2006 of USDA’s ARMS survey were linked to form a 
pooled time-series cross sectional dataset.  This national farm level data was then analyzed using 
ordinary least squares and repeated cross-sections regression with fixed effects on the year 
variable. Three models were constructed for each of the components of the DuPont Model. The 
NetProfitMargin, or the measure of profitability, was regressed against acres operated, Theil 
Entropy, farm type, farm size, and interaction term between farm size and acres operated. Here, 
the Theil Entropy (TMI) is measuring the degree of concentration of gross income from various 
farm outputs. The greater the diversity of the farm, such as a vast arrays of crops and livestock, 
the higher the TMI. The dataset was also sorted into two different groups to analyze the three 
models. One group excluded farms with less than $100,000 in gross value of sales and the other 
included all the farms.  
     Mishra et al. confirmed what they had hypothesized in regard to the effects of agricultural 
specialization on assets. In all regions throughout the nation, specialization has a negative impact 
on asset efficiency; hence, an increase in specialization results in a decrease in the asset turnover 
ratio. On the other hand, there was no evidence that specialization increases gross margins as 
hypothesized. In terms of vertical integration, it was only found to be significant in increasing 
solvency in the Southeast. Its effect on profitability was not measured in this study but will be in 
the future. It was also found that the number of acres operated was significant in the Net Profit 
Margin model as well as the Asset Turnover model. This relationship suggests that larger farms 
experience economies of scale and are more profitable than smaller farms.  
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     Yet, other researchers have broken down the farming community further into categories such 
as age groups. Adhikari, Mishra, and Chintawar conducted research in early 2009 that assessed 
the adoption of technology on profits for Young and Beginning Farmers (YBFR). YBFR are 
those farm operators that are less than 35 years old who also have less than 10 years experience. 
The study was focused on identifying factors of whether to adopt technologies, specifically 
genetically modified (GM) crops, and then the effects of those GM crops on profits. This 
analysis utilized data from the 2004-2006 USDA ARMS surveys. Since this dataset includes 
household information it is very fitting in determining relevant relationships that may exist with 
YBFR. This is important given that the demographics of YBFR are relatively different than 
traditional farms with more education and off-farm income. (Adhikari, Mishra and Chintawar 
2009)   A tobit model is used to estimate likelihood of technology adoption. Once it was 
determined that the technology was adopted, the reduced form of the original profit 
maximization equation was estimated with return on asset (ROA) as the dependent variable. 
ROA was used in place of net farm income as they concluded that a resource-based financial 
measure is best. A quantile approach was then extended from the single ROA equation to 
examine changes in the coefficients across the sample. The results were then presented for the 
50
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles. It was found that the adoption of GM corn decreased ROA by 1.3% and 
0.7% in the 50
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles, respectively. It is also indicated from the results that 
education negatively affects profits. For an additional year of schooling you can expect ROA to 
decrease by .04% and 0.1% in the 50
th
 and 90
th
 percentile, respectively. These results are 
justified with YBFRs as they tend to have higher education, more off-farm income, and control 
smaller farms. Furthermore, it was found that more experienced farmers are less likely to plant 
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GM crops while larger cash grain farms are more likely to plant GM crops. And lastly, Adhikari 
et al. found that larger farms, as well as more leveraged farms, experience higher profitability. 
     A similar econometric approach was taken in 2010 with the research conducted by 
Reimbaeva, Shaik, and Mishra. They set out to examine the use of input resources in production 
grain and livestock agriculture. Furthermore, they analyzed the outputs that came as a result and 
how these outputs changed over time and groups. The study made use of state and aggregate 
national production accounts for the farm sector. This dataset included the time period of 1960-
2004 and contained information on the various farm level inputs as well as outputs. Again, a 
quantile approach was utilized, which allows the relationship between the endogenous and 
exogenous variables to change with each group. Moreover, a between and within regression 
method was used, whereby the contribution between and within time-series and cross-section can 
be assessed at each quantile. Results showed the average relationships between the different 
inputs and outputs across nine quartiles. These relationships are divided into the entire pooled 
dataset, between cross-sections, between time-series, and within cross-section time-series 
quartile. One of the most considerable findings was the technology “year” variable was 
significant between time-series and in the pooled dataset. The coefficient of this variable is very 
close between all quartiles showing that the contribution towards output is constant throughout 
time and region. Also, the materials variable turned out to be significant in all but two of thirty-
six situations. Moreover, the coefficients of this variable were the highest among the inputs. For 
an additional unit of materials, output is expected to increase by 32, 43, 37, and 48 percent on 
average in the 5
th
 quartile when estimating between cross-section, pooled, between time series, 
and within cross-section and time-series, respectively. (Reimbaeva, Shaik and Mishra 2010) The 
chemical variable and the labor variable were also found to be significant between time-series, 
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within time-series and cross-section, and in the pooled dataset. On the other hand, capital and 
land were not significant in most situations implying that the ownership of land is not as 
important in agriculture today.  
2.2 Summary 
     Much of the previous research has looked at the affects of tenure, size, and leverage ratio on 
many different measures of profitability. The consensus is that rental agreements and leverage 
ratios have a positive impact on profitability. However, there is debate about the importance of 
variables such as farm size where some researchers (Garcia et al. 1982, and Sonka et al. 1989) 
found it insignificant, while others (Ali and Johnson 1987, and Purdy et al. 1997) found it to 
positively impact profitability. While studies on these variables do not agree, they give valuable 
insight on the relationships and provide ideas for further research. The profit measures used in 
these studies are: return to labor, return to management, net income, net income from operations, 
return on assets, return on equity, net farm income per acre, net farm income per dollar of equity, 
net farm income per dollar of assets, management return per dollar of equity, gross farm income, 
and profit margin ratio. These measures cover a wide range of management and study focuses, 
but nonetheless, give insight into these relationships.  
     Previous studies have focused on rental agreements as a whole versus owning the land. They 
have not focused on decomposing tenure position into share lease, cash renting, and land 
ownership. This thesis will analyze each of these positions separately providing a more robust 
model. Furthermore, ownership of machinery is also not addressed in the previous research.  The 
significant and sign of leasing machinery is also addressed in this thesis. Few previous studies 
have analyzed these relationships year-by-year for farm sector and other economic changes. 
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Analyzing these relationships within different time periods will provide analysis not previously 
performed.   
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3     DATA 
 
    This chapter explains the motivation to use this specific data in this thesis. Also, this chapter 
outlines the dataset creation process and explains the various criteria that were applied to 
construct the various datasets. The data in this chapter is divided into two sections: pure grain 
farms spanning from 1996 to 2009 and pure grain farms within three different time periods. 
Finally, the key assumptions made to conduct this analysis are stated in this chapter. The chapter 
begins with the motivation for the choice of dataset.  
3.1 Motivation for Dataset  
     Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) was the source of data for use in this 
thesis. FBFM is “a cooperative educational-service program designed to assist farmers with 
management decision-making” (Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association 2011). 
FBFM provides a record service whereby members can receive financial analysis reports as well 
as management advice. Financial records are collected by the field staff either on-farm or at a 
local association’s office each year. These financial records include income statements, balance 
sheets, statement of cash flows, and tax documentation. The income statement is a financial 
statement that calculates the net farm income by deducting a farm’s expenses from its revenues, 
or returns. The balance sheet is a financial statement that itemizes a farm’s current, intermediate, 
and long-term assets along with whether these items are held as a liability or equity. A liability 
shows the farm has a debt obligation on the item while equity shows the owned portion. The 
statement of cash flows is a financial statement that breaks down changes in the value or balance 
of items on the balance sheet into operating, investing, and financing categories. This statement 
follows the flow of cash and cash equivalents in and out of the operation.  The results of these 
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financial statements are then compiled into a master database containing information from all 
associations. Furthermore, there is a certification process and coding system of the financial 
statements that ensures data integrity.  This process certifies that the data is correct and is 
suitable for comparative analysis.  
     Over the years FBFM has established an identity as a trustful source of information, as 
illustrated by their high retention rates. Each year, over ninety-five percent of their cooperators 
renew their membership. ( Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association 2006) The first 
of these associations was formed in 1924 and it wasn’t until 1949 that all the association came 
together to form the Illinois FBFM Associations. (Illinois Farm Business Farm Management 
Association 2011) FBFM also has a long-standing relationship with the Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Economics (ACE) at the University of Illinois and the University of 
Illinois Extension. In addition to this, the Illinois FBFM State Office is housed in the same 
building as the Department of ACE which allows interactions among FBFM personnel and the 
Department of ACE. FBFM data has also proven to be a valuable tool in assessing the 
relationship of profitability and financial structure of agricultural operations in Illinois. The same 
dataset from previous years was used numerous times in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s by 
Ellinger and Barry, Sonka et al., and Plumley and Hornbaker for various studies.  
     The geography and composition of agriculture in Illinois, where this dataset is derived, 
contributes relevant insight to other agriculture regions across the nation. Illinois is home to 
varying growing degree day ranges and precipitation amounts. Moreover, Illinois is host to a 
wide variety of livestock entities such as dairy, beef, and hog operations as well as various types 
of production grain operations. These operations range from farms that plant nothing but corn in 
Northern and Central Illinois to farms that double-crop winter wheat and employ other crops 
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such as sorghum in Southern Illinois. Illinois is part of the highly productive region referred to as 
the “Corn-Belt”. The heart of the “Corn-Belt” covers most of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, and 
parts of Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. The 
results from this study will be applicable to all these farms whose primary focus is grain 
production. Furthermore, analysis is performed on the complete dataset of all farms in Illinois to 
show general trends and relationships established throughout the entire agriculture industry.    
3.2 Dataset Creation  
     The main dataset used in this analysis, known as the Economic Management Analysis (EMA) 
dataset, is based off the EMA Report. This report is broken down into returns and costs, whose 
specific values make up the database. The current database utilized in this study has a total of 
8,957 farm entries over the last fifteen years. However, this does not mean that there is data each 
year for each of these farms, only that there is information for 8,957 farms for at least one year. 
This data was originally in two dimensional matrixes by farm by year for each variable with a 
select few variables in three dimension matrixes by farm by year by crop type. Concatenation 
was then performed on this dataset to construct an entry per farm per year that would have each 
variable from the financial statement as a column. This process yielded 134,355 entries, the 
majority of which were null due to no information for that farm for the specific year. The first 
criterion imposed on the complete dataset is that the income statements are certified usable.  
For the EMA report to be certified usable: 
1. All revenues and expenses reflecting input and output for a complete operator(s) economic 
unit should be included. All expenses should pertain to the revenues that are included on the 
income statement. 
2. Grain and livestock inventories have been reviewed and are complete and accurately priced. 
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3. All accrual adjustments (accounts receivable, accounts payable and prepaid expenses) that 
are material should be included. Especially such accounts as FSA accounts receivable and 
payable, accrued interest expense and prepaid fertilizer, seed and pesticides. 
4. Check for reasonableness and accuracy when there is either a negative or very high farm 
operating income.  ( Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association 2006, 1) 
3.2.1 Pooled Dataset 
     While return and cost information found on the EMA is crucial, an accurate portrayal of the 
financial structure of each agricultural operation is needed for this analysis. The balance sheet 
provides this information by itemizing the assets and liabilities by usable life and maturity.  
Hence, the EMA dataset is joined with FBFM’s B-Stat database. The B-Stat database is a 
database comprised of balance sheet information at the operator level. Since the EMA database 
is on a farm wide basis, this B-Stat information is aggregated to the farm level by FBFM’s “Farm 
ID”. By joining these databases, the dataset is restricted for farms that have complete financial 
information. This constraint takes the number of entries of 46,570 down to 15,439. Moreover, 
the balance sheet information must also be certified usable for comparative analysis by the field 
staff.  
For the balance sheet to be certified usable: 
1. Certify sole proprietors only. 
2. The loan page must be in balance (or verification that beginning and end of year balances 
are correct). 
3. Current liabilities must be free of any significant omissions due to overlooking: 
- account payable with merchants and dealers 
- accrued interest on operating, intermediate, and long-term liabilities 
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- accrued income taxes 
- current portion of intermediate and long-term debt to be paid prior to next year's crop    
  production is separated from the portion due beyond one year on loan pages. 
4. Inventory values per unit must be reviewed for reasonableness. 
5. Accounts receivable and prepaid expenses must be reviewed for completeness. 
6. Non-farm assets must be complete and values reviewed critically for reasonableness,   
    requesting source documents if necessary. 
7. For fair market value balance sheet review values for: 
     a. marketable bonds and securities 
     b. machinery and equipment 
     c. farm and non-farm real estate 
8. If it is a book with reconciled cash flow, change in modified cost basis net worth must   
    reconcile with earnings less withdrawals within $5,000, or you can identify omissions to  
    explain a larger discrepancy. 
9. If the balance sheet is believed to be accurate, certification is allowed even though total   
    cash flow was not posted. 
   10. Lease equipment - add some value to fair market value of equipment to reflect any equity   
    in the lease if not listed separately on the balance sheet. 
   11. Strongly encourage including all CCC loans as a liability, with the corresponding bushels  
        of grain as an asset. Some farmers reporting loans as income may not have followed this   
        procedure. 
12. Complete age and family information on front cover page of record. For additional help  
      seeAE-4422, Directions for Keeping the Illinois Farm Business Record, Part VII,  
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      Guidelines for Establishing Your FBFM Balance Sheet. 
( Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association 2006, 2-3) 
 
Applying this usability criterion further restricts the number of entries down to 14,832.  
Consequently, the pooled dataset for all farms in Illinois that have both usable financial 
statements contains 14,832 entries. This dataset will be analyzed and used to contrast the Pure 
Grain Farms and Time Period databases. It will also be used as a master database which further 
criterion will be imposed to form the previously mentioned datasets.   
3.2.2 Pure Grain Farms 
     This study focuses on analyzing the profitability of pure grain farms in Illinois as well as 
three separate time periods within the complete period ranging from 1996-2009.  These pure 
grain farms constitute the majority of the dataset so they provide a suitable sample size that can 
be further analyzed in these time periods. And due to the fact that they make up the majority of 
the farms in Illinois, the majority of agriculture policy and research is directed at this subset of 
operations. Pure grain farms are operations whose primary production focus is on corn and 
soybean production. The first criterion imposed is the farm type variable associated with the 
operation must be a grain operation that feeds less than 40% of the crop output to livestock.   The 
second criterion is the farms are required to have 90% of their acres planted in corn or soybeans.   
The actual operator acres are used here opposed to the tillable acres. The “operator acres” is the 
figure used to compute the returns and costs on a per acre basis. Operator acres are more 
appropriate than tillable acres as it is the measured tied back to the operation’s financial 
structure. “Tillable acres” are the total amount of acres that an operator may run his equipment 
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on, even if it is not tied to that specific operation.  For example, custom farming or split 
agreement with another operator, where each operator does not receive a full share of the profit. 
     Another criterion imposes a maximum level of custom farming that each operation conducts. 
Each of the farms in the models has less than 10% of their gross revenue coming from custom 
farming. Custom farming is a type of farming where the operator gets compensated a flat fee on 
a per acre basis or similar type of compensation. In this situation, all the inputs are usually 
provided to the operator other than equipment and fuel. This criterion is important in these 
models because an operation comprised of high custom farming does not have much, if any, 
interest in ownership or renting land, which is one of the main independent variables in the 
models. 
     Furthermore, to be considered a pure grain farm the majority of an operation’s revenue should 
be derived from its grain production activities. Hence, a criterion was imposed on the dataset that 
requires farms to have less than ten percent of their revenue coming from livestock operations. 
While a farm can focus their grain operations solely on corn and soybean, these outputs could be 
used as inputs for their livestock operations, the main focus of the entity. Using grain as feed for 
the livestock changes the dynamics of the business and hence their financial structure should not 
be analyzed with other farms who are trying to maximize profits from selling grain.      
3.2.3 Time Period Sub-Samples 
      The entire dataset consists of years 1996 to 2009, a time period that saw much volatility and 
change throughout the agriculture industry. One of the most significant factors determining farm 
profitability is changes in the prices received throughout this time period. While this is important 
to note, this study is focused on the financial structure of the entities and relationships with 
profits. These prices and other factors such as yields must be accounted for in the analysis. By 
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breaking the datasets up into sub-samples it enables relationships to be analyzed within these 
different agricultural economic periods.  
     The first period is 1998-2000. This period is characterized by relatively depressed prices in 
both corn and soybeans. The average marketing year corn prices as shown in Figures 3.1 were 
$2.04, $1.91, and $1.91 for the 1998/1999, 1999/2000, and 2000/2001 marketing years, 
respectively. And the average marketing year soybean prices as shown in Figure 3.2 were $5.01, 
$4.75, and $4.62 for the 1998/1999, 1999/2000, and 2000/2001 marketing years, respectively. 
The analysis of this time period will indicate the relationship of financial structure and 
profitability during a time when the agriculture industry’s returns were below the financial 
industry’s returns.  
     The second of the three time periods being analyzed is 2002-2004. This time period is 
considered to be a normal pricing period up to this point and will act similar to a baseline 
scenario. The average marketing year corn prices as shown in Figures 3.1 were $2.32, $2.42, and 
$2.14 for the 2002/2003, 2003/2004, and 2004/2005 marketing years, respectively. And the 
average marketing year soybean prices as shown in Figure 3.2 were $5.66, $7.51, and $5.84 for 
the marketing years 2002/2003, 2003/2004, and 2004/2005, respectively. The analysis on this 
time period will provide us with insight on the dynamics of Illinois agriculture before the ethanol 
mandates and blending tax credits were put into place.  It is important to contrast this period with 
the post-ethanol profitability levels in the event that the blender’s credit and mandate would 
disappear at some point in the future. The disappearance of this credit could cause the supply and 
demand of corn and soybeans to return to levels seen in this time period; hence, similar 
profitability levels and relationships would be experienced by the agriculture industry.  
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     The last of the sub-sample periods is from 2007-2009. This period is defined by high prices, 
historically, in corn and soybeans. The average marketing year corn prices as shown in Figures 
3.1 were $4.09, $4.01, and $3.53 for the 2007/2008, 2008/2009, and 2009/2010 marketing years, 
respectively. And the average marketing year soybean prices as shown in Figure 3.2 were 
$10.40, $10.20, and $9.80 for the marketing years 2007/2008, 2008/2009, and 2009/2010, 
respectively. These high prices are normally attributed to the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), a 
federal law established by The Energy Policy Act of 2005. This law mandates certain levels of 
ethanol and biodiesel to be blended with fuel in the United States. In addition, “The Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 amended and increased the RFS, requiring 9 billion 
gallons of renewable fuel use in 2008, stepping up to 36 billion gallons by 2022”  (American 
Coalition for Ethanol 2010). This alternative use of corn and soybeans created demand for the 
commodity driving up prices.       
3.3 Assumptions Made  
     To make this analysis applicable to the agriculture industry in Illinois and more specifically, 
the grain producers, a key assumption must be stated. It is assumed in this analysis that the 
primary goal of the operation is profit maximization. While this is normally considered the focus 
of any business in a perfectly competitive market, agricultural operations sometimes differ in 
their focus. As Dobbs and Smolik (1996) alluded to in their comparison of conventional vs. 
alternative farming operations, many operators derive utility from many immeasurable ventures 
such as organic farming. Other factors such as the agrarian lifestyle and sole proprietorship 
business structure provide utility that may lead operators away from a profit maximizing 
outcome. However, these factors are neglected as they are incalculable and are not the focus of 
this analysis.  
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3.4 Summary 
     This thesis utilizes data from Illinois FBFM spanning from 1996 to 2009. This database is 
comprised of variables taken off each farm’s financial statements. Various criteria are imposed to 
sort the dataset into pure grain farms. These are farms focused on corn and soybean production 
with less than 10% of revenue derived from custom farming or livestock and those who feed less 
than 40% of their crop output to livestock. This dataset with all pure grain farms from 1996-2009 
is then decomposed into different time periods. These time periods correspond to a depressed 
pricing period (1998-2000), a “normal” pre-ethanol price period (2002-2004), and a post-ethanol 
price period (2007-2009). The next chapter explains the models and variables used in this study.  
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3.5 Figures 
Figure 3. 1   Average Corn Price Received in IL 95/96-10/11 
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Source: National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) of the US Department of Agriculture ( http://www.agstats.state.il.us/website/reports.htm )
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Figure 3. 2     Average Soybean Price Received in IL 95/96-10/11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$0.00
$2.00
$4.00
$6.00
$8.00
$10.00
$12.00
D
o
ll
a
rs
 p
e
r 
b
u
sh
e
l
Marketing Year Average Soybeans Farm Price Received in Illinois
for the 1995/1996 - 2010/2011 Marketing Year(s)
Source: National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) of the US Department of Agriculture ( http://www.agstats.state.il.us/website/reports.htm )
  
34 
 
4     METHODOLOGY 
 
     This chapter describes the structure of the models used to explain the profitability of pure 
grain farms in Illinois. Three models are separately applied to the entire dataset spanning 1996-
2009 and then also to the three-year average of farms for the time periods 1998-2000, 2002-
2004, and 2007-2009.  All three models use the same independent variables, but have different 
dependent variables. The dependent variables and reasons for choosing them will be discussed in 
this chapter.  Furthermore, this chapter will present justification for each independent variable as 
well as expectations to their significance and contribution towards profitability. 
4.1 Dependent Variables  
     This thesis is comprised of three models which correspond to the different profitability 
measures, each a different dependent variable. The first model analyzes the net farm income per 
acre (nfiperacre), which will act as the dependent variable. This variable shows the profitability 
of the farm without adding back in the interest expense. This model is constructed to achieve a 
dollar amount compared to the other models which are in percentages. This model is more 
practical as one does not have to relate the output back to each farm’s financial structure, which 
is the case with the other two models. An easy interpretation of the model is provided for readers 
and farm operators by this measure. This variable is adjusted for size by dividing the number of 
acres operated on, which allows comparison across all farms.  Plumley and Hornbaker (1991) 
used net farm income per acre as one of their four management performance measures to 
establish benchmark financial ratios through mean analysis. They note that using a measure such 
as management returns per dollar of equity may be more appropriate as it accounts for 
opportunity cost of labor and capital. However, utilizing a return measure as stated would not 
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give an accurate measure for farms that do not put a high value on gaining equity. There is a 
large portion of highly leveraged farms that are operating on the margin through rental 
agreements and hence, do not necessarily want to build up large equity or even draw working 
capital, a large portion of equity, out of the farm each year. Furthermore, Ashok et al. (1999) also 
used net farm income in their analysis of limited resource and small farms but did so in absolute 
terms. They noted that this measure would not be appropriate to compare across farms, as is done 
here, so this motivated adjusting it per acre. On the other hand, this profitability measure is 
aimed at land intensive production agriculture entities and is not as relevant to livestock focused 
entities. 
     The second model analyzes the return on assets (ROA) of the farms. This is net farm income 
plus interest expenses divided by the sum of short, intermediate, and long-term assets. This is 
used as a measure of profitability, the percentage return on the assets held by farmers. Adhikari 
et al. chose to use ROA instead of net farm income as they felt a resource-based financial 
measure was best. Hence, this study makes use of ROA while also taking net farm income and 
transforming it into a resource-based measure by dividing it by the number of acres. Return on 
assets is useful to assess how successful management is at using assets to generate earnings. 
Ellinger and Barry also used return on assets in their 1987 evaluation of land tenure and farm 
size on profitability.  Ten variables are regressed against ROA to explain the variation and will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  
     The third model analyzes the return on equity (ROE) of the farms. This variable is calculated 
by dividing the net farm income by net worth. This measure of profitability states the percentage 
ROE held by farmers. It is useful to assess profitability in relation to their owned interest. Mishra 
et al. (2008) decomposed the ROE to assess how farm specialization and vertical integration 
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affect asset efficiency, profit margin, and financial leverage. Return on equity is central to many 
management decisions regarding financial structure of each farm. When the interest on one’s 
assets is higher than their return on assets, it is more beneficial to not take on more debt. On the 
other hand, when the return on assets is greater than the interest rate, it would be beneficial to 
leverage up the operation and take on more debt both impacting the ROE. The significance of 
this ratio to management is also important in determining tenure position and specifically the 
decision on whether to buy addition acreage. The statistical significance of independent variables 
will indicate the drivers of profitability associated with an operator’s owned assets. Hence, the 
ROE model is used to contrast the ROA by looking at the significance of independent variables 
between the two models. 
4.2 Independent Variables  
     The dependent variables described will be explained by the regressors or independent 
variables in the three models. These independent variables are components or calculations based 
on the components of the pooled dataset of FBFM’s EMA and B-Stat data. There are two 
categories of these independent variables that will be used to explain the variation in the three 
profitability models. The first category consists of structure variables that are the main focus of 
the study. The other category is made up of variables used as controls so the comparison of farms 
among different groups is possible.  
 
4.2.1 Structural Independent Variables  
     The structural independent variables are the variables whose expectations and significance are 
the main concern of the study. These are the variables that are hypothesized to be the main 
drivers of variation in our three profitability measures. Furthermore, these variables are all 
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directly linked to the financial structure of each farming operation. The first of these structure 
variables is the debt-to-asset ratio (da). This study will refer to da as the specific independent 
variable and D/A for the debt-to-asset in the more general sense. The da is the sum of short, 
intermediate, and long-term debt of the farm divided by the sum of short, intermediate, and long-
term assets held by the farms. This variable assesses the level of risk that an operation has, 
giving a ratio of leverage held. The higher the D/A ratio is, the riskier the operation. Conversely, 
the lower the D/A ratio is, the less financial risk an operation holds. While the operation is not 
subject to high interest expenses with a low D/A ratio, it should be noted that other risks such as 
land value changes are more prevalent with higher amounts of equity. While this risk of land 
value change is not captured in this study, it needs to be considered by operators. In the 
nfiperacre model, the coefficient is expected to be negative, because interest expenses are not 
added back into the profitability measure as in the ROA model. Since this interest expense is not 
added back into profitability, it is less beneficial to finance one’s land purchases, equipment, etc. 
with debt. A zero coefficient is expected for da in terms of return on assets as it should not 
depend on how those assets are funded.  However, Adhikari et al. concluded that more leveraged 
farms experience higher profitability in their analysis of return on assets. For the ROE model, it 
is expected that da will have a positive coefficient, as debt goes up the relative equity goes down 
and hence the returns that are typically greater after financing a new purchase or activity are 
divided by a smaller number in the ROE calculation. When the interest on one’s assets is higher 
than their return on assets, it is more beneficial to not take on more debt. On the other hand, 
when the return on assets is greater than the interest rate, it would be beneficial to leverage up 
the operation and take on more debt. In this situation additional capital could be invested in 
something outside of the operation to diversify earnings and potentially increase overall profits. 
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Purdy et al. (1997) found that leverage had an inverse relationship with mean return on equity, 
which opposes the expectation here, so impact of D/A may depend on time period.  
     The next five variables are associated with land ownership and tenure. Land tenure refers to 
the control of the tillable acres and corresponds to variables dumshare75, dumcash75, 
dumowned40, dumshare5075, and dumcash5075 in each model.  The land can either be owned 
by the farm operator or the operator can enter into different kinds of rental agreements, whether 
it is cash renting or share leasing. The most common share lease agreement is 50/50 lease 
whereby the operator provides all the labor and equipment and covers half of the inputs costs. 
The owner of the land covers the other half of the input costs and then the output is split down 
the middle. In this situation, each party is usually responsible for selling their half of the grain. 
The second independent variable, (dumshare75), is a dummy variable for farms that share lease 
75% or more of the land they farm. Likewise, there is also a dummy variable (dumshare5075) 
for operators who share lease 50-75% of their tillable acres. These variables will be useful to see 
if it is more profitable to have leasing agreements compared to cash renting or owning land. This 
variable’s effect on nfiperacre is expected to be significant but the direction is unknown. It is 
expected that the relationship will change from year to year depending on input and output prices 
and other farm sector factors such as government payments and weather. On the other hand, 
share leasing is expected to negatively affect ROA compared to the other tenure positions. This is 
due to the financial risk being cut in half on the operator’s side. Hence, smaller returns are 
expected with smaller risks when they are measured in terms of an operator’s assets. Likewise, a 
farm with the majority of tillable acres share leased is expected to have lower returns to equity in 
comparison to cash renting or owning the land again due to lower risk. The expectations of the 
dumshare5075 are the same as dumshare75; however, a smaller magnitude is expected in terms 
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of the coefficient, or contribution of change to the dependent variable. Conceptually, if one of 
these tenure positions is significantly more profitable while taking into account risk, the move 
towards this form of tenure should cause the returns to be bid down until the return of different 
positions are in equilibrium. It should be noted that these tenure positions are more relevant to 
the grain production agriculture and hence, this study will not focus on livestock operations. 
    The next two variables correspond to the other type of rental agreement, cash rent. In a cash 
rent agreement the operators pay a fee per acre to rent the land and receive all the profits. The 
third variable, (dumcash75) is a dummy variable for operations that cash rent 75% or more of 
their tillable acres. As before, there is also a dummy variable (dumcash5075) for operations that 
cash rent 50-75% of their tillable acres. These variables are based on the portion of land one is 
renting to farm. Depending on the amount of this cash rent payment and yearly returns, cash 
renting could be profitable or unprofitable. Hence, the affect of cash renting on net farm income 
per acre is unknown as the most profitable tenure position is unknown. The sign of these 
coefficients are expected to be positive in the ROA model. This is expected as cash rent 
arrangements involve more risk than a share rent agreement and, arguably, land ownership 
because the operator has to cover all inputs and expenses, unlike share leasing, but does not 
benefit from land appreciation as is the case with land ownership. Hence, we expect there to be a 
risk premium associated with cash renting. This risk premium is also expected for return on 
equity.  
     The last tenure position corresponds to when the operator owns the land on which they 
operate. The fourth variable is another dummy variable for operations that own 40% or more of 
the tillable acres (dumowned40).  This variable is used to contrast the other dummy variables 
associated with renting arrangements. The relationship with land ownership and profitability is 
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unknown. Reimbaeva et al. found that land was not significant in many of their models implying 
that the ownership of land is not as important in agriculture today. Hence, there is no expectation 
of land ownership on net farm income per acre. However, it is expected that this variable is 
going to have a positive effect on ROA as operators take on more financial risk to purchase land 
whether it is paid in full or financed. Land ownership (dumowned40) is also expected to have a 
positive effect on the ROE, as it is again a more risky position than share leasing and cash 
renting in some situations. However, Garcia et al. (1980), Ellinger and Barry (1987), and Purdy 
et al. (1997) found that ownership of land is inversely related to profitability. While the amount 
of owned acreage has stayed fairly steady, the significance may change as operators are going 
from share leasing to cash renting. 
     Implementing these specific dummy variables for tenure positions occurred after extensive 
testing and consideration of the interactions between possible measures. These dummy variables 
allow accurate relationships to be measured that are not possible with standard measurement of 
percentages. The goal of the study is to define relationships between all three tenure types (cash 
rent, share lease, ownership) and different measures of profitability. When percentages are used 
multicollinearity issues develop. Multicollinearity occurs when the independent variables are 
highly correlated, which results in inaccurate coefficient estimates of the individual independent 
variables that are correlated. This occurs because the number of acres cash rented plus the 
number of acre share leased and the number of acres owned add up to total tillable acres. 
Therefore, when the percentage of land cash rented, share leased, and owned is calculated, the 
percentages add up to one. This relationship is referred to as perfect multicollinearity which 
results in the statistical software package used (STATA) to drop one of the variables or the 
constant coefficient. Hence, these percentages were calculated and then divided into groups. 
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These groups were formed based on the distribution of farms among these percentages. Sample 
sizes were set to include 15-25% of the farms in each of the five categories. Furthermore, there 
were also around 10% of the farms that did not fall into any category, that act as a baseline and 
prevent the same multicollinearity problems as discussed earlier. Generating these dummy 
allows the effects of all three tenure positions on profitability to be measured.  
     The last two structure variables are associated with operational expenses of the farm.  The 
first of these expense variables is total power costs per acre (powtotal). This variable explains the 
relative amount of all power expenses per acre. These power costs include: depreciation, fuel, 
utilities, light vehicles, machinery hired and leased, and repair costs. The expected sign of the 
coefficient is negative as the variable is comprised of expenses. For the net farm income per acre 
model, the coefficient is expected to have to a negative coefficient somewhere around one. Since 
both variables are measured by the acre, an additional dollar of expenses will yield somewhere 
around one dollar less income when analyzed at the margin as done in a regression analysis. In 
terms of ROA and ROE, total power costs per acre are also expected to have a negative sign and 
be a significant driver of profitability. As indicated by Mishra et al. (1999) the most efficient way 
of becoming more profitable is to control fixed and variable costs. In farming these power costs 
are some of the largest fixed and variable costs and need to be managed carefully.  
     The last structure variable is power hire divided by total power costs (hireperc). This shows 
the amount of hired and leased equipment as a percentage of all the power costs. As stated 
previously, these power costs include depreciation, fuel, utilities, light vehicles, and repair costs. 
This variable gives a relative view of the amount of equipment the operator does not own or 
work hired out through hiring machinery. It is expected that this variable will negatively affect 
the profitability as net farm income only accounts for hired labor costs. Hence, management 
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returns are not taken into consideration in the ROA, which are not utilized when machinery is 
hired out. This would result in paying out additionally to have someone else do the work. Using 
the same intuition, hireperc is also expected to negatively affect return on equity making it 
injurious to all profitability measures.  
 
4.2.2 Control Independent Variables  
     The control independent variables are those variables added to the model to allow for more 
accurate comparison across farms. These variables are also hypothesized to account for variation 
of profitability; however, these variables are either static or cannot be readily manipulated 
without major changes to each operation. Also, these variables are not tied into the financial 
structure of the operation, which is the main focus of this analysis. The first of the control 
independent variables is the soil productivity rating (spr). This is an index value out of 100 that 
measures the quality of the soil. A positive coefficient is expected for this variable in each of the 
three profit measures (nfiperacre, ROA, ROE), as one would expect a higher spr to result in 
increased crop yields. This assumption would result in higher revenues and higher net farm 
income. Mishra et al. (1999) found that soil productivity was statistically significant to increase 
net farm income of limited resource farms, as we have hypothesized here for the pure grain 
farms in Illinois. Again, this variable is relevant to grain production entities in this analysis. 
     The second control variable is the number of hundreds of tillable acres (hundsofacrtil). This is 
included as an economy of scale measure. The bigger the farmer is, the larger the economies of 
scale. Hence, it is expected that the operator will receive inputs more cheaply by buying in bulk 
and less equipment costs per acre given bigger, more efficient equipment on average. As an 
operation lowers the costs per acre, higher profitability overall is expected, hence, a higher ROA, 
ROE, and nfiperacre.  This positive coefficient expectation is in concurrence of Purdy, 
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Langemeiser, and Featherstone’s (1997) research where they found that increases in farm size 
had a positive effect on financial performance while not significantly increasing risk. However, 
the results of Garcia et al. (1980) indicate that farm size is not a major factor in determining 
profitability.  
     The last set of control variables were established to control for variation in the data that are 
specific for each year. Each year in agriculture is typically very different from the others, and 
this fact is exemplified within the FBFM dataset for these corn and soybean farms. Furthermore, 
the average marketing prices per year at the end of Chapter 3 show one aspect that creates major 
variation of returns from year-to-year. Other things such as yields, precipitation, severe weather 
events, and government policies have major effects on the profitability. These factors need to be 
accounted for so they do not affect the significant or magnitude of the other independent 
variables in the regression analysis. To account for these problems dummy variables were 
created for every year except one. The year (2009) that corresponds to the missing dummy 
variable acts as a baseline for comparative analysis of returns across years.  
     These three models (nfiperacre, ROA, ROE) will be applied to the entire dataset as well as 
subsample datasets for the time period 1998-200, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009. The interactions 
and relationships of these variables will be analyzed in the next two chapters. Chapter 5 provides 
summary statistics and means analysis, which show changes in the dependent and independent 
variables among different groupings of other independent variables. Chapter 6 provides 
regression analysis that explains the variation of the dependent variable in terms of the structure 
and control independent variables. The results of the regression analysis shows if the 
expectations come to fruition and what are the main determinants of profitability for Illinois pure 
grain operators.  
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4.3 Summary  
     The three models corresponding to different profitability measures are analyzed in this 
chapter. These three models are separately applied to the dataset spanning 1996-2009 and then to 
each of the time period models. These time periods correspond to a depressed pricing period 
(1998-2000), a “normal” pre-ethanol pricing period (2002-2004), and a post-ethanol pricing 
period (2007-2009).  The independent variables are justified in the chapter as well as 
expectations of them on each profit measure. The econometrics used for regression analysis are 
discussed in Chapter 6, as well the results of the regressions. The next chapter presents 
descriptive statistics of the variables discussed in this chapter for the entire period and within 
each of the three-year time periods.  
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5     DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON PURE GRAIN FARMS 
      
     This chapter outlines descriptive statistics for the dataset that is focused on pure grain farms. 
A description of how each variable is constructed and a summary of the main variables used in 
the regression analysis are presented in this chapter. Also, changes of these variables across time 
are also analyzed in this section, as well as the time periods from 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 
2007-2009. Furthermore, changes in these variables across difference groups of debt-to-asset 
ratio, farm size, and land tenure within different time periods are also analyzed here. The tables 
referenced in the text are presented at the end of this chapter. Additional descriptive statistics are 
provided in more depth for the pure grain farms in Appendix A. Furthermore, descriptive 
statistics for all farm types combined are presented in Appendix B.  
5.1 Overall Statistics for Pure Grain Farms  
     Table 5.1 provides a description of the composition of each variable. The equation used to 
calculate each variable is provided if it is applicable.  For instance, the return on assets (ROA) is 
calculated by adding interest expenses to each farms net farm income and then dividing by total 
assets. Also, the units of each variable are stated in Table 5.1.  Many of these variables have been 
divided by a common measure, such as assets, to provide a relative number that can be analyzed 
across farms.  
    Table 5.2 shows summary statistics of all pure grain farms throughout Illinois. The first three 
variables (ROA, ROE, and nfiperacre) are used to assess the returns of these crop production 
entities. The results indicate the average return on assets (ROA) was 11% for these farms from 
1996 to 2009. While this seems like a fairly large return, the standard deviation is also quite 
large. The average return on equity is also 11% for these farms from 1996-2009. The standard 
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deviation of .52 shows that this is a more volatile, less precise measure of returns. The last of the 
return measures, net farm income per acre, has a fourteen-year average of $125. This return 
measure has also seen a high standard deviation of $112 per acre and a range from $-377 to 
$1101 over this period. The next four variables in Table 5.2 correspond to tenure measures. 
Here, tenure refers to the ownership of the land and whether it is cash rented, 50-50 share leased, 
or owned by the operator. The first variable, tenureowned shows the amount of tillable acres that 
are owned by the operator. The fourteen-year average over all farms is 17% but it changes 
significantly across the database with a standard deviation of 22%.  Each of these variables is 
measured in percentage terms; hence, they have a range of 0% - 100%. This fact is revealed 
empirically in the dataset as the farms in the database vary significantly when it comes to tenure 
position. The results show that about a half of the acres farmed in the database were on a share 
rent agreement, while a third were cash rented and the rest were owned by the operator on 
average from 1996-2009. The change of these tenure positions over time is presented later in this 
chapter.  
      The debt-to-asset ratio (da) has a fourteen-year average of 0.31 for the entire time period. 
Changes in the debt position are assessed in much more depth later in this chapter. The average 
soil productivity rating (spr) is 84. This is an indexed number of 100 and indicates the average 
soil of pure grain farms in Illinois. While it is difficult to evaluate this number and tie it to an 
exact output, it provides a relative ranking system to control for soil quality across farms. The 
average farm size (acrtil) in the dataset is 1045 acres; however, there is a sizable standard 
deviation of 631 acres. Hireperc shows what percent of total power costs are devoted to hiring 
and leasing equipment. The average is 12% with a standard deviation of 14%, showing that 
farms do not typically hire or lease out much of the machinery needed for production.  
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     The remaining eight variables correspond to the amount of debt and assets held per acre. 
These are divided by acres to provide a relative view across farms no matter the size. One of the 
most important things to draw attention to here is the average amount of equity held by farms. 
By taking the difference of total assets per acre ($2250) and total debt per acre ($536) you get the 
average owner equity per acre ($1714).   
     Table 5.3 shows the correlation between the variables that is included in the regression 
analysis. Note that these correlations are close to zero which means multicollinearity should not 
be an issue in the regression analysis; however, further analysis is also performed. The strongest 
correlation is between tenureshare75 and tenureshare5075 at -0.34. This is a low to moderate 
relationship which makes sense conceptually as 49% of acres on average are in share lease 
agreements. If the farm does not fall in the category of farms above 75% share leased acres, there 
is a good chance they fall in the category with 50-75% being shared leased.  Also, note the low 
correlation between the three return measures.   ROA has a correlation of -0.04 with ROE and 
0.18 with nfiperacre.  The correlation between nfiperacre and ROE is 0.13. This low correlation 
shows these measures of profitability differ in composition and must be considered individually 
when making management decisions.  
5.2 Trends Over Time in Pure Grain Farms  
     Table 5.4 shows how the returns of pure grain farms have changed from 1996-2009. As you 
can see the returns in 1996 and 1997 were high, however the returns became depressed for about 
four years after that. The average net farm income for 1998 was $34 per acre while just ten years 
later the average was $278, a difference of $244 per acre. The depressed returns, which stemmed 
from the low prices as shown in Chapter 3, motivated the analysis of the time period 1998-2000. 
Furthermore, you can see that the time period of 2002-2004 has fairly average returns in terms of 
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the entire period reported. The returns for 2007-2009 are substantially greater than the rest of the 
time period so it is of interest to see if the same relationships between profitability and the 
independent variables hold when looking across time periods.   
     Table 5.5 shows the changes in average tenure position over time. The percentage of acreage 
owned has remained relatively constant, increasing a total of three percent over the fourteen-year 
period. However, significant changes took place with acreage steadily coming out of share lease 
agreements and going into cash rent agreements. It is hypothesized that this change was brought 
on by an aging population of land owners. Cash rent leases offer the owners of the land a known 
fixed income amount which reduces their risk but typically their returns too. The fixed income 
aspect of the cash rent agreement appeals to the aging land owners who need income certainty to 
meet normal living expenses. Furthermore, the accounting and performance of a cash rent 
agreement are more simplistic and offer great benefits to both the owner and operator in that 
respect.   
     Table 5.6 shows the changes in assets as well as farm size and D/A ratio from 1996-2009. All 
three categories (current, intermediate, and long-term) of assets have more than doubled in the 
fourteen-year period analyzed. Meanwhile, the average farm size also grew by approximately 
150 acres. This can account for the increases in the long-term portion of the assets. Debt-to-asset 
position fell from .34 to .26 during the same time period. A common size study is presented in 
Table 5.7 whereby all the asset values are divided by operator acres.  
     The same information for average debt position is presented in Table 5.8. The current, 
intermediate, and long-term debt averages have also doubled in the fourteen-year time period. 
However, as stated above the D/A ratio has fallen. While it might look like operators are taking 
on more debt now than in earlier parts of the time period, in relative terms that is not the case.  A 
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case can be made that during 2007-2009 operators decreased their D/A ratio due to large 
amounts of cash on hand from the run-up in prices. However, it is not known if these 
fundamentals have changed in the post-ethanol time period. More analysis is performed, 
focusing on this relationship both with further mean analysis in this chapter, and regression 
analysis in Chapter 6.  
     There is also an additional common size analysis stated by operator acres in Table 5.9. This 
table allows comparison across years more accurate as the debt is adjusted for the size of the 
operation. The most notable aspect of this table is the low long-term debt. While long-term debt 
per acre has raised $90 over a ten-year period, this is not real significant if appreciation in land 
prices is considered. Also, the current debt has remained higher than long-term for the entirety of 
the time period analyzed, which can be explained by the popularity of rental agreements. A high 
long-term debt indicates the financing of land, while current debt indicates operating expenses 
like rental agreements.  
     Table 5.10 shows the mean values of the three year averages for each variable used in the 
time period analysis. As stated before, each farm had to have complete financial statement for all 
three years to be analyzed, so these values were averaged to compare across time periods. One of 
the interesting results is the gradual increase of hireperc across the time periods. This shows that 
farmers are leasing or hiring out relatively more of the work as a percentage of power costs. And 
once again, the changes in returns and land tenure are evident in the results.  This table also lists 
the averages for the dummy variables associated with tenure position. Since these averages 
correspond to dummy variables, they show the percentage of farms in each category of tenure 
position. Around 10% of the farms are not included in a category to represent a baseline tenure 
position. This position corresponds to farms that share lease less than 50%, cash rents less than 
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50%, and own less than 40% of tillable acres. The results show the transition of farms from share 
leasing agreements to cash rent agreements through time.  
5.3 Divisions by Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
     This section analyzes changes in variables across D/A ratio groups through time. Table 5.11 
shows the average values of each variable within different D/A ranges for 1998-2000. An 
interesting trend appears whereby the number of tillable acres increases with the D/A ratio until 
above the 60% percent mark. The number of tillable acres for pure grain farms with more than 
60% D/A ratio declines, compared to the 40-60% group of farms. This last group of highly 
leveraged smaller farms (on average) could include a lot of young and beginning farmers as 
analyzed by Adhikari et al. (2009). However, when looking into the level of assets per acre, the 
trend becomes more apparent. The farms in the lower D/A groups have significantly more assets 
per acre (totalassacr, currassacr, intassacr, ltassacr). On the other hand, debt per acre 
(totaldebtacr, currdebtacr, intdebtacr, and ltdebtacr) does increase as the debt-to-average ratio 
increases but the change is less pronounced. Both the average assets per acre decreasing and the 
debt levels increasing are causing these farms to be more leveraged not just increasing the debt 
levels as one might think. It is also clear from Table 5.11 that the percentage of owned acres 
decreases as the farm becomes more leveraged. Initially, these acres transition into share lease 
acres going from the 0-20% to the 20-40% groups. However, this changes in the last two groups 
and these tenure positions are split 38% and 50% for the 40-60% D/A group and 35% and 62% 
for the 60%< D/A group in regards to cash rented percentage and share leased percentage, 
respectively. Further analysis shows if the share lease agreement will continue to dominate these 
farms that are highly leveraged and operate on thin margins.  The same tables for the 2002-2004 
and 2007-2009 time periods follow.  
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     The analysis of variable averages within D/A groups is continued for the time period of 2002-
2004 with Table 5.12. This time period has significantly more observations in the sample being 
analyzed. The most notable change from the previous time period analyzed (1998-2000) is the 
decrease in the average farm size of the 0-20% D/A group. The average tillable acres went from 
857 in the 1998-2000 time period to 766 in the 2002-2004 time period. The highly leveraged 
farms in this time period are utilizing leased and hired machinery even more than in the previous 
period. Hireperc is 21% for the 60% and over D/A group compared to 10 or 11% in the other 
D/A groups in this time period. This goes against the intuition that operators would finance this 
equipment and raise their debt levels with lower leasing and hiring of machinery. Hence, it is 
inferred that these expenses are also financed with something such as an operating loan. The 
trends in assets and debt per acre remain similar to the previous period as well as changes in 
magnitude. Again, there is a gradual change from owned acres to renting agreement as these 
farms become more leveraged. However, in this time period we see the cash rent agreements 
dominate the share lease agreements in the 60%< D/A group. These tenure positions are further 
analyzed in this chapter by breaking them down into groups and applying a means analysis, as 
performed here.  
     Table 5.13 analyzes the changes in averages for variables within different groups of D/A 
ratios as the previous two tables, but does so for the 2007-2009 time period. Again, the sample 
size grew significantly for this time period to a total of 486 farms. Note that the number of 
tillable acres has increased in this time period. Furthermore, the average farm size of the 40-60% 
D/A group fell from 1247 in the 2002-2004 time period to 1172 acres in this time period. These 
acres left this group and went to two tails of D/A groups, the 0-20% and greater than 60% group. 
The percentage of machinery leased and hired did not change significantly across groups as in 
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the previous time periods. However, the tenure of land does change significantly as the 60%< 
D/A group saw an increase from 5% owned land in the 2002-2004 period to 12% in this period. 
This can be attributed to the high amount of land purchases in this period of high profitability. 
Also, the tendency for highly leveraged farms to own a smaller portion of land but farm more 
land is prevalent in this time period, as in the previous time periods. These relationships in farm 
size are analyzed next using the same method of means analysis for groups of farm size.  
5.3 Divisions by Farm Size 
     Table 5.14 analyzes the average values of each variable among different groupings of farm 
size during the 1998-2000 time period. The debt-to-asset ratio steadily rises as the number of 
acres increases. These large operations own a smaller percent of their acres and have a tendency 
to have more share lease agreements in this time period. Also, a very interesting point is the 
disparity of assets per acre between the large farms versus the small farms. The average total 
assets per acre for farms with 0-500 acres is $2642, while this number is only $1446 for farms 
over 1500 acres. The major disparity appears in the long-term assets which include things such 
as farm real estate, buildings and improvements, personal residence, and contract and notes 
receivable. The regression analysis shows if spreading these assets more thinly results in a more 
efficient operation, and hence, a more profitable enterprise. Also, the debt per acre is increasing 
as the farm size increases but the magnitude is much smaller than the changes in assets per acre.  
     Table 5.15 analyzes these farm size ranges for the 2002-2004 time period. The table shows 
the same increase in D/A ratio with increases in size as does each of the other time periods. An 
interesting trend that was not present in the previous time period is the tendency to move away 
from hiring and leasing equipment as a percentage of total power costs. This makes sense as an 
operation grows they bring on more full-time labor and hence, do not need to hire as much. 
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Another notable difference between this period and the 1998-2000 period, is the increase in total 
assets per acre in the 0-500 acre farms and the 500-1000 acre farms. The majority of which is 
coming from increases in long-term assets. 
     Table 5.16 shows the averages within farm size groups for the period of 2007-2009. As in the 
previous time period, the percent of machinery hired and leased is declining as the size of the 
farm increases. Also, this period shows major increases to the total assets per acre compared to 
the 2002-2004 period. Again, the majority of these increases are taking place in long-term assets 
most likely due to land value appreciation. Furthermore, this period experienced changes in the 
tenure positions. These tenure relationships are analyzed later in a means analysis in Table 15.15.  
     The remaining tables in this chapter are focused on the mean analysis of variables among 
different tenure groups. These tenure positions are stated as the percentage of acres an operator 
owns. The first of these tables, Table 5.17 reports these values for the 1998-2000 time period. 
The graph indicates that D/A ratio falls as the percentage of acres owned increases. This is not 
completely intuitive as one would expect to finance the most expensive input -- the land. Also, 
the table shows of the acres not owned, the majority are share leased within each tenure group 
for this time period.   
     Table 5.18 shows these variable averages by acres owned, but does so for the 2002-2004 
period. The interesting trend from the previous time period is the 10-20% and 20-35% land 
owned groups saw a decrease in average acres with much of this acreage showing up in the 0-
10% land owned group. Furthermore, 188 out of 355 pure grain farms fell into the 0-10% 
ownership category in the 2002-2004 time period.  Again, in this time period, the majority of 
rented acres are in share lease agreements; however, the magnitude of this difference is much 
smaller than the previous period.  
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     The final table in this chapter, Table 15.19, shows these averages by tenure group for the 
years 2007-2009. Like the previous table showed, there is further movement of higher average 
tillable acres into the 0-10% land ownership group. In this sample 237 of the 486 farms fell into 
the 0-10% category. The percentage of pure grain farms residing in this tenure category remains 
relatively steady at 52%, 53%, and 48% for the 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009 time 
periods, respectively. The percent of land held in the farms with 0-10% land ownership also 
remains fairly steady at 49%, 54%, and 52% for the 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009 time 
period, respectively.  
5.4 Summary 
     Earlier in the chapter, it is shown that tillable acres are increasing with time; however, the 
fundamentals of ownership are not changing as much as expected. There is a definite gradual 
shift towards cash renting agreement; however, the percentage of land owned by the operator is 
staying relatively steady between the time periods analyzed here. Keep in mind from Table 5.10 
that the average percentage of acres owned is 15%, 16%, and 17% for the 1998-2000, 2002-
2004, and 2007-2009 time periods, respectively. Also, while the absolute amount of debt has 
risen per acre, the D/A ratio has actually fallen from .34 to .36 between the first and last time 
periods analyzed. The returns have a definite upward trend through time as shown in Table 5.6; 
however, it is uncertain if these changes in tenure position, farm size, and leverage amount are 
the main drivers of changes in performance. Regression analysis is performed in Chapter 6 
showing the contribution and significant of these variables to the profitability of pure grain farms 
in Illinois.  
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5.5 Graphs 
Table 5. 1     Variable Descriptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Variable Descriptions 
ROA % (Net Farm Income + Interest Expenses)/(Total Assets) 
ROE % (Net Farm Income)/(Net Worth) 
nfiperacre $ per acre (Net Farm Income)/ (Acres Operated) 
tenureowned % (# of Acres Owned)/ (# of Tillable Acres) 
tenurecash % (# of Acres Cash Rented)/ (# of Tillable Acres) 
tenureshare % (# of Acres Share Leased)/ (# of Tillable Acres) 
tenureshareofrent % (# of Acres Share Leased) / (# of Acres Share Leased + # of Acres Cash Rented) 
dumshare75 Binary Denotes farms with over 75% of their tillable acres in share leases 
dumcash75 Binary Denotes farms with over 75% of their tillable acres in cash rent agreements 
dumowned40 Binary Denotes farms that own more than 40% of their Tillable Acres  
dumshare5075 Binary Denotes Farms that Share Lease 50%-75% of their Tillable Acres 
dumcash5075 Binary Denotes Farms that Cash Rent 50%-75% of their Tillable Acres 
da % (Total Debt/ Total Assets) 
spr Index of 100 Soil Productivity Rating 
acrtil # Number of Tillable Acres 
hundsofacrtil 100s of acres (Number of Tillable Acres)/ 100  
hireperc % Percentage of total power costs that are hired or leased equiptment 
totalassacr $ per acre Total Assets per Operator Acre  
currassacr $ per acre Current Assets per Operator Acre 
intassacr $ per acre Intermediate Assets per Operator Acre 
ltassacr $ per acre Long-Term Assets per Operator Acre 
totaldebtacr $ per acre Total Debt per Operator Acre 
currdebtacr $ per acre Current Debt per Operator Acre 
intdebtacr $ per acre Intermediate Debt per Operator Acre 
ltdebtacr $ per acre Long-term Debt per Operator Acre
Units of 
Variable Description 
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Table 5. 2     Summary Stats All Pure Grain (APG) 96-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics  
All Pure Grain Farms 1996-2009 
ROA % 11% 25%
ROE % 11% 52%
nfiperacre $ per acre  $     124.63  $      111.79 
tenureowned %  $         0.17  $          0.22 
tenurecash %  $         0.33  $          0.31 
tenureshare % 0.49$         0.34$          
da ratio 0.31 0.24
acrtil # 1045 631
hireperc % 12% 14%
spr index of 100 84 10
totalassacr $ per acre 2,250.49$  1,735.77$   
currassacr $ per acre 522.63$     418.41$      
intassacr $ per acre 652.59$     441.02$      
ltassacr $ per acre 1,075.28$  1,305.66$   
totaldebtacr $ per acre 535.94$     394.38$      
currdebtacr $ per acre 251.01$     177.79$      
intdebtacr $ per acre 80.08$       93.57$        
ltdebtacr $ per acre 204.85$     268.35$      
Sample 10357
Mean
Standard 
Deviation 
Units of 
Variable 
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Table 5. 3     Correlation Matrix APG 96-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
All Pure Grain Farms 1996-2009 
ROA ROE nfiperacre da dumshare75 dumcash75 dumowned40 dumshare5075 dumcash5075 spr hundsofacrtil powtotal hireperc
ROA 1
ROE -0.04 1
nfiperacre 0.18 0.13 1
da -0.27 0.04 -0.27 1
dumshare75 0.00 0.04 0.06 -0.02 1
dumcash75 0.04 0.01 -0.08 0.12 -0.26 1
dumowned40 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 -0.18 -0.25 -0.16 1
dumshare5075 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.34 -0.21 -0.13 1
dumcash5075 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 0.08 -0.28 -0.17 -0.09 -0.23 1
spr 0.02 0.01 0.15 -0.09 0.15 -0.05 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 1
hundsofacrtil 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.12 -0.07 0.01 -0.17 0.06 0.11 0.01 1
powtotal -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.15 0.09 0.17 -0.09 0.06 -0.10 -0.08 1
hireperc 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.13 0.12 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.06 0.09 1
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Table 5. 4     Return Measure Average Trends by Year APG 
 
* Individual variable averages and standard deviations by year can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Return Measure Average Trends by Year   
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year
Sample
Size ROA ROE NFI/acre
1996 421 16% 19%  $        145 
1997 497 11% 12%  $          94 
1998 495 6% 2%  $          34 
1999 567 9% 8%  $          61 
2000 654 7% 10%  $          81 
2001 679 10% 5%  $          47 
2002 701 8% 8%  $          56 
2003 838 10% 12%  $          97 
2004 931 11% 13%  $        123 
2005 963 8% 4%  $          81 
2006 879 11% 9%  $        131 
2007 959 17% 21%  $        285 
2008 870 15% 17%  $        274 
2009 903 8% 7%  $        118 
Total 10357 11% 11%  $        125 
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Table 5. 5     Tenure Position Average Trends by Year APG 
 
     * Individual variable averages and standard deviations by year can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tenure Position Average Trends by Year   
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year
Sample
Size 
Tillable 
Acres
Tenure 
Owned 
Tenure 
Cash  
Tenure 
Share 
1996 421 963 15% 23% 72%
1997 497 928 15% 25% 69%
1998 495 952 15% 25% 69%
1999 567 963 17% 25% 68%
2000 654 966 16% 27% 66%
2001 679 981 19% 30% 62%
2002 701 1004 17% 31% 62%
2003 838 1043 17% 34% 58%
2004 931 1085 17% 36% 55%
2005 963 1073 17% 34% 57%
2006 879 1096 18% 38% 51%
2007 959 1120 19% 38% 51%
2008 870 1114 18% 41% 48%
2009 903 1116 18% 40% 49%
Total 10357 1044 17% 33% 58%
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Table 5. 6     Asset Position Average Trends by Year APG 
 
* Individual variable averages and standard deviations by year can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset Position Average Trends by Year   
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year
Sample
Size 
Current 
Assets  
Intermediate 
Assets 
Long-Term 
Assets 
Tillable 
Acres
Debt-to 
Asset Ratio 
1996 421  $   253,754  $       299,378  $    440,610 963 0.34
1997 497  $   254,350  $       320,206  $    467,443 928 0.33
1998 495  $   241,381  $       343,476  $    475,787 952 0.35
1999 567  $   247,647  $       350,047  $    526,124 963 0.33
2000 654  $   253,967  $       359,045  $    536,278 966 0.35
2001 679  $   248,271  $       368,490  $    592,466 981 0.34
2002 701  $   252,996  $       363,532  $    560,012 1004 0.36
2003 838  $   282,152  $       384,403  $    644,815 1043 0.34
2004 931  $   330,283  $       437,408  $    737,941 1085 0.33
2005 963  $   334,472  $       453,851  $    791,098 1073 0.31
2006 879  $   401,756  $       490,324  $    864,441 1096 0.30
2007 959  $   569,317  $       540,487  $    997,774 1120 0.27
2008 870  $   675,453  $       572,592  $ 1,031,453 1114 0.26
2009 903  $   613,141  $       646,718  $ 1,091,875 1116 0.26
Total 10357  $   377,679  $       443,315  $    742,151 1044 0.31
  
61 
 
Table 5. 7     Asset Position Average per Acre Trends by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset Position Average per Acre Trends by Year   
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year
Sample
Size 
Current 
Assets/ ac.  
Intermediate 
Assets/ac. 
Long-Term 
Assets/ac. 
Tillable 
Acres
Debt-to 
Asset Ratio 
1996 421  $             419  $            513  $         668 963 0.34
1997 497  $             419  $            543  $         739 928 0.33
1998 495  $             393  $            581  $         756 952 0.35
1999 567  $             407  $            596  $         835 963 0.33
2000 654  $             407  $            619  $         852 966 0.35
2001 679  $             387  $            590  $         923 981 0.34
2002 701  $             397  $            591  $         896 1004 0.36
2003 838  $             406  $            589  $         945 1043 0.34
2004 931  $             454  $            621  $      1,050 1085 0.33
2005 963  $             477  $            652  $      1,124 1073 0.31
2006 879  $             536  $            681  $      1,222 1096 0.30
2007 959  $             723  $            740  $      1,360 1120 0.27
2008 870  $             822  $            743  $      1,412 1114 0.26
2009 903  $             768  $            857  $      1,516 1116 0.26
Total 10357  $             522  $            653  $      1,075 1044 0.31
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Table 5. 8     Debt Position Average Trends by Year APG 
 
* Individual variable averages and standard deviations by year can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debt Position Average Trends by Year   
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year
Sample
Size 
Current 
Debt 
Intermediate 
Debt   
Long-Term 
Debt 
Tillable 
Acres
Debt-to 
Asset Ratio 
1996 421  $142,454  $        47,322  $   106,986 963 0.34
1997 497  $144,503  $        52,055  $   106,853 928 0.33
1998 495  $154,463  $        51,908  $   111,639 952 0.35
1999 567  $145,964  $        50,130  $   122,590 963 0.33
2000 654  $144,800  $        47,370  $   129,760 966 0.35
2001 679  $157,877  $        51,487  $   141,926 981 0.34
2002 701  $169,073  $        53,188  $   142,357 1004 0.36
2003 838  $172,234  $        56,222  $   152,962 1043 0.34
2004 931  $192,911  $        64,857  $   167,059 1085 0.33
2005 963  $199,001  $        63,276  $   174,182 1073 0.31
2006 879  $217,460  $        68,197  $   195,676 1096 0.30
2007 959  $248,782  $        76,248  $   200,758 1120 0.27
2008 870  $271,846  $        77,113  $   190,074 1114 0.26
2009 903  $269,147  $        83,155  $   200,622 1116 0.26
Total 10357  $196,609  $        62,452  $   160,900 1044 0.31
  
63 
 
Table 5. 9     Debt Position Average per Acre Trends by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debt Position Average per Acre Trends by Year   
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year
Sample
Size 
Current 
Debt/ac.
Intermediate 
Debt/ac.  
Long-Term 
Debt/ac.
Tillable 
Acres
Debt-to 
Asset Ratio 
1996 421  $       222  $              77  $          157 963 0.34
1997 497  $       227  $              84  $          159 928 0.33
1998 495  $       237  $              81  $          162 952 0.35
1999 567  $       216  $              76  $          167 963 0.33
2000 654  $       214  $              74  $          179 966 0.35
2001 679  $       225  $              77  $          202 981 0.34
2002 701  $       235  $              76  $          199 1004 0.36
2003 838  $       223  $              77  $          199 1043 0.34
2004 931  $       237  $              79  $          208 1085 0.33
2005 963  $       241  $              76  $          216 1073 0.31
2006 879  $       256  $              79  $          225 1096 0.30
2007 959  $       285  $              83  $          233 1120 0.27
2008 870  $       307  $              83  $          225 1114 0.26
2009 903  $       319  $              95  $          247 1116 0.26
Total 10357  $       251  $              80  $          205 1044 0.31
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Table 5. 10     Means of 3-Yr Averages by Time Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Means of  3-Year Averages By Time Period  
All Pure Grain Farms 
1998-2000 2002-2004 2007-2009 
ROA 8% 9% 13%
ROE 7% 12% 14%
nfiperacre  $           65  $               95  $              236 
tenureowned 15% 16% 17%
tenurecash 25% 32% 40%
tenureshare 60% 53% 43%
dumshare75 0.44 0.29 0.21
dumshare5075 0.21 0.27 0.21
dumcash75 0.09 0.13 0.18
dumcash5075 0.09 0.14 0.19
dumowned40 0.11 0.10 0.12
da 0.30 0.34 0.24
spr 86 84 84
acrtil 983 1038 1125
hireperc 10% 12% 13%
totalassacr 1,822$      1,934$          2,905$            
currassacr 403$         431$             781$               
intassacr 615$         609$             781$               
ltassacr 804$         894$             1,343$            
totaldebtacr 437$         498$             571$               
currdebtacr 212$         236$             286$               
intdebtacr 70$           73$               81$                 
ltdebtacr 155$         189$             204$               
Sample 232 355 486
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Table 5. 11     Variable Averages by D/A, 98-00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% - 20% 20%< - <40% 40% - 60% 60%<
ROA 8% 7% 8% 10%
ROE 5% 6% 9% 18%
nfiperacre 81$              66$                  46$                37$              
acrtil 857 1027 1111 995
da 0.10 0.31 0.49 0.69
hireperc 9% 8% 12% 15%
tenureowned 22% 13% 11% 3%
tenurecash 20% 17% 38% 35%
tenureshared 58% 70% 50% 62%
totalassacr 2,456.85$    1,744.16$        1,228.29$      851.23$       
     currassacr 503.18$       384.75$           304.94$         299.37$       
     intassacr 772.12$       629.58$           418.87$         401.71$       
     ltassacr 1,181.55$    729.83$           504.49$         150.14$       
totaldebtacr 234.56$       519.27$           599.84$         579.22$       
     currdebtacr 111.60$       230.38$           302.69$         351.66$       
     intdebtacr 38.84$         76.03$             87.75$           152.02$       
     ltdebtacr 84.13$         212.86$           209.40$         75.54$         
Sample Size 87 71 59 15
Variable Averages Sorted by Debt-to-Asset Ratio
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois Averaged over Time Period: 1998-2000
Debt-to-Asset Ratio Ranges 
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Table 5. 12     Variable Averages by D/A, 02-04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% - 20% 20%< - <40% 40% - 60% 60%<
ROA 8% 9% 11% 13%
ROE 6% 9% 16% 30%
nfiperacre 117$             95$                  85$                62$             
acrtil 766 1134 1247 994
da 0.10 0.30 0.49 0.70
hireperc 11% 10% 11% 21%
tenureowned 25% 15% 10% 5%
tenurecash 24% 28% 37% 51%
tenureshared 51% 57% 53% 44%
totalassacr 2,898$          1,906$             1,247$           1,011$        
     currassacr 652$             374$                305$              303$           
     intassacr 777$             654$                444$              398$           
     ltassacr 1,469$          877$                498$              310$           
totaldebtacr 252$             567$                610$              687$           
     currdebtacr 133$             245$                295$              353$           
     intdebtacr 35$               78$                  88$                125$           
     ltdebtacr 85$               245$                226$              209$           
Sample Size 105 121 90 39
Variable Averages Sorted by Debt-to-Asset Ratio
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois Averaged over Time Period: 2002-2004
Debt-to-Asset Ratio Ranges 
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Table 5. 13     Variable Averages by D/A, 07-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% - 20% 20%< - <40% 40% - 60% 60%<
ROA 13% 14% 14% 16%
ROE 11% 15% 20% 38%
nfiperacre 270$             225$               178$             172$           
acrtil 999 1251 1172 1024
da 0.10 0.29 0.48 0.65
hireperc 13% 13% 11% 13%
tenureowned 23% 15% 7% 12%
tenurecash 32% 44% 50% 48%
tenureshared 45% 41% 42% 40%
totalassacr 3,732$          2,466$            1,814$          1,812$        
     currassacr 953$             679$               573$             629$           
     intassacr 942$             689$               592$             551$           
     ltassacr 1,838$          1,098$            649$             631$           
totaldebtacr 322$             698$               869$             1,180$        
     currdebtacr 164$             351$               424$             570$           
     intdebtacr 46$               91$                 130$             254$           
     ltdebtacr 112$             255$               315$             356$           
Sample Size 211 193 70 12
Variable Averages Sorted by Debt-to-Asset Ratio
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois Averaged over Time Period: 2007-2009
Debt-to-Asset Ratio Ranges 
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Table 5. 14     Variable Averages by Farm Size, 98-00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 - 500 500< - <1000 1000 - 1500 1500<
ROA 7% 8% 8% 9%
ROE 4% 7% 8% 8%
nfiperacre 56$              68$                  67$                60$              
acrtil 395 764 1192 1973
da 0.19 0.30 0.34 0.37
hireperc 12% 9% 11% 10%
tenureowned 23% 14% 12% 15%
tenurecash 22% 25% 26% 22%
tenureshared 55% 60% 61% 63%
totalassacr 2,642$         1,778$             1,619$           1,446$         
     currassacr 459$            409$                396$              335$            
     intassacr 823$            628$                543$              477$            
     ltassacr 1,361$         741$                681$              633$            
totaldebtacr 376$            436$                453$              478$            
     currdebtacr 157$            228$                220$              206$            
     intdebtacr 63$              71$                  72$                71$              
     ltdebtacr 155$            137$                161$              202$            
Sample Size 35 105 61 31
Variable Averages Sorted by Farm Size 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois Averaged over Time Period: 1998-2000
Farm Size Ranges (acres)
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Table 5. 15     Variable Averages by Farm Size, 02-04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 - 500 500< - <1000 1000 - 1500 1500<
ROA 7% 10% 10% 10%
ROE 6% 11% 17% 12%
nfiperacre 96$               97$                  96$                88$             
acrtil 394 771 1198 2043
da 0.20 0.32 0.39 0.39
hireperc 16% 11% 12% 9%
tenureowned 28% 16% 10% 15%
tenurecash 31% 32% 32% 32%
tenureshared 41% 52% 58% 53%
totalassacr 3,474$          1,965$             1,472$           1,528$        
     currassacr 801$             410$                366$              329$           
     intassacr 963$             613$                534$              468$           
     ltassacr 1,709$          942$                572$              730$           
totaldebtacr 441$             509$                480$              542$           
     currdebtacr 183$             246$                242$              237$           
     intdebtacr 54$               72$                  80$                74$             
     ltdebtacr 204$             190$                158$              231$           
Sample Size 41 160 101 53
Variable Averages Sorted by Farm Size 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois Averaged over Time Period: 2002-2004
Farm Size Ranges (acres)
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Table 5. 16     Variable Averages by Farm Size, 07-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 - 500 500< - <1000 1000 - 1500 1500<
ROA 10% 13% 14% 15%
ROE 10% 14% 15% 16%
nfiperacre 246$             241$               241$             219$           
acrtil 371 758 1211 2023
da 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.27
hireperc 17% 13% 12% 10%
tenureowned 32% 18% 14% 12%
tenurecash 33% 36% 42% 46%
tenureshared 35% 45% 44% 42%
totalassacr 4,630$          2,982$            2,542$          2,259$        
     currassacr 1,075$          765$               737$             697$           
     intassacr 1,149$          782$               734$             632$           
     ltassacr 2,406$          1,435$            1,070$          929$           
totaldebtacr 664$             557$               559$             559$           
     currdebtacr 312$             283$               281$             283$           
     intdebtacr 49$               76$                 90$               97$             
     ltdebtacr 303$             198$               187$             179$           
Sample Size 62 180 131 113
Variable Averages Sorted by Farm Size 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois Averaged over Time Period: 2007-2009
Farm Size Ranges (acres)
  
71 
 
Table 5. 17     Variable Averages by Tillable Acres Owned, 98-00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% - 10% 10%< - <20% 20% - 35% 35%<
ROA 9% 7% 8% 7%
ROE 9% 6% 5% 3%
nfiperacre 62$              65$                  67$                71$              
acrtil 922 1100 1216 782
da 0.34 0.31 0.23 0.18
hireperc 9% 12% 9% 9%
tenureowned 3% 14% 26% 55%
tenurecash 27% 23% 27% 17%
tenureshared 71% 63% 48% 28%
totalassacr 1,367$         1,753$             2,310$           3,234$         
     currassacr 380$            394$                466$              441$            
     intassacr 594$            562$                705$              684$            
     ltassacr 393$            796$                1,138$           2,108$         
totaldebtacr 388$            506$                421$              539$            
     currdebtacr 227$            203$                183$              198$            
     intdebtacr 81$              71$                  50$                47$              
     ltdebtacr 81$              232$                187$              294$            
Sample Size 121 48 33 30
Variable Averages Sorted by Percentage of Tillable Acres Owned 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois Averaged over Time Period: 1998-2000
Percentage of Tillable Acres Owned by Operator 
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Table 5. 18     Variable Averages by Tillable Acres Owned, 02-04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% - 10% 10%< - <20% 20% - 35% 35%<
ROA 11% 8% 8% 6%
ROE 17% 8% 8% 4%
nfiperacre 91$               94$                  103$              109$           
acrtil 1064 1033 1162 818
da 0.39 0.33 0.26 0.19
hireperc 12% 11% 11% 10%
tenureowned 3% 14% 26% 60%
tenurecash 37% 29% 30% 18%
tenureshared 60% 56% 44% 23%
totalassacr 1,375$          1,828$             2,497$           3,885$        
     currassacr 374$             383$                509$              671$           
     intassacr 591$             587$                605$              730$           
     ltassacr 410$             859$                1,382$           2,485$        
totaldebtacr 462$             532$                510$              578$           
     currdebtacr 259$             221$                196$              211$           
     intdebtacr 87$               68$                  56$                37$             
     ltdebtacr 116$             243$                258$              330$           
Sample Size 188 77 45 45
Percentage of Tillable Acres Owned by Operator 
Variable Averages Sorted by Percentage of Tillable Acres Owned 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois Averaged over Time Period: 2002-2004
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Table 5. 19     Variable Averages by Tillable Acres Owned, 07-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0% - 10% 10%< - <20% 20% - 35% 35%<
ROA 15% 13% 12% 10%
ROE 18% 13% 11% 7%
nfiperacre 223$             249$               246$             253$           
acrtil 1199 1171 1127 832
da 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.17
hireperc 11% 13% 13% 16%
tenureowned 3% 15% 27% 58%
tenurecash 45% 43% 34% 25%
tenureshared 52% 43% 39% 17%
totalassacr 2,089$          2,777$            3,654$          4,940$        
     currassacr 714$             796$               776$             973$           
     intassacr 720$             776$               841$             923$           
     ltassacr 655$             1,205$            2,038$          3,043$        
totaldebtacr 506$             548$               671$             717$           
     currdebtacr 291$             271$               286$             290$           
     intdebtacr 96$               73$                 71$               56$             
     ltdebtacr 119$             203$               314$             372$           
Sample Size 237 105 67 77
Variable Averages Sorted by Percentage of Tillable Acres Owned 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois Averaged over Time Period: 2007-2009 
Percentage of Tillable Acres Owned by Operator 
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6     RESULTS 
 
     This chapter presents the results of the regression analysis to explain the variation of the three 
profitability measures (net farm income per acre, return on assets, and return on equity). Results 
for the entire database spanning 1996-2009 as well as the time periods of 1998-2000, 2002-2004, 
and 2007-2009 are evaluated with the significance of the variables contrasted between the 
subsamples. The econometrics used for this analysis are detailed in this chapter, as well as, 
presenting tests used to insure appropriateness of each model.  
6.1 Econometrics and Statistical Tests Used for Complete Dataset  
     The complete dataset for 1996 through 2009 is treated as a panel dataset and is grouped by 
time and by form. To accommodate panel data, a Fixed Effects Model (FEM) is used rather than 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model. The FEM allows for heterogeneity across groups with 
variation across time. Incorporating fixed effects allows the FEM to provide more efficient 
parameter estimates than OLS. 
     A FEM was chosen over a random effects model based on results from a Hausman 
Significance Test. The Hausman Significance Test compares the significance of the estimates of 
the Fixed and Random Effects Models, allowing assessment of the more appropriate model.  
This FEM choice is intuitive as the fixed effects is expected to capture farm specific factors not 
readily available in the dataset as a measurable variable. Examples of potential captured effects 
are risk propensity, management skills, and the management skills of the firm. In contrast, the 
Random Effect Model (REM) would have taken these effects that were apparent at the farm level 
and added a random error term to each one. These error terms would be derived from some 
random distribution with a mean value of zero and a variance of   
 . Conceptually, this method 
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does not agree with our intuition that these differences at the farm level are not random 
occurrences.  
    Other specification concerns are the presence of autocorrelation, multicollinearity, and 
heteroscedasticity. To identify whether autocorrelation is a problem the Wooldridge Test is used. 
In the return models, there is concern with both the autocorrelation through time within each 
farm and correlation within the time panel. The Wooldridge Test is used to spot autocorrelation 
in panel data by testing the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation. The resulting F-
statistics were 13.216, 250.648, and 30.521 for the Return on Assets, Net Farm Income/acre, and 
Return on Equity models, respectively. Each of the p-values corresponding to the Wooldridge 
Tests is 0.00.  Hence, the null is rejected and it is concluded there is evidence of first order 
autocorrelation. Dummy variables for years 1996-2008 were added to each model to account for 
factors specific to each year. By including these dummy variables effects such as changes in 
price and yields of corn and soybeans can be measured.  Note that only thirteen dummy variables 
are used to allow 2009 as a baseline as well as allowing an intercept to be displayed in the 
output.  
     To detect any possible multicollinearity, or high correlation between independent variables, 
variance inflation factors (VIF) are computed for each variable in all the models. If the VIF is 
greater than ten, multicollinearity could be prevalent. VIF statistics are presented in Table 6.1.  
In the database with all the pure grain farms in Illinois, the VIFs were all less than ten with the 
exception of the soil productivity rating variable. This is due to the spr variable not having 
significant variation throughout the dataset. This can be attributed to the fairly homogenous soil 
utilized in the pure grain farms. The farms that have less productive soil will typically diversify 
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their operation with larger amounts of livestock or other crops which would disqualify them for 
this dataset. Overall, these results indicate that multicollinearity is not an issue.  
     In this panel set, heteroscedasticity -- where the variances of the error terms are not constant 
and changing over time -- is believed to exist for two reasons. First, there is evidence of 
heteroscedasticity when running the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test prior to applying a 
fixed effects estimator. While the conclusion is not solely based on this, this test is not available 
when using fixed effects because there are no residuals to square and regress the independent 
variables against in a fixed effects model. Furthermore, the autocorrelation assumption is already 
violated as shown by the Wooldridge Tests; hence, OLS standard errors will not be appropriate.  
The appropriate method is using clustered standard errors that are calculated in such a way they 
are consistent in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. These standard errors are 
clustered on the Farm ID and are more suitable than robust standard errors. This is because the 
cluster covariance matrix is consistent when using fixed effects as the traditional robust 
covariance matrix is not. (Arrelano 1987) 
 
6.2 Econometrics and Statistical Tests Used for Time Period Datasets  
     The datasets constructed for the individual time periods of 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-
2009 use different econometrics than the complete set of pure grain farms in Illinois. These 
datasets are comprised of farm averages for each three year period and hence, are not panel 
datasets. Hence, a simpler approach is taken and ordinary least squares (OLS) is used for 
estimation. As before, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity can be potential problems, 
however autocorrelation is not a factor here as each of these datasets does not change over time. 
Again, variance inflation factors are calculated for each of the three time periods subsets (see in 
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Table 6.2). The results indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem within any of these time 
period subsets of data.  
     Since ordinary least squares estimation is used, heteroscedasticity can be detected with the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test that takes the residuals, squares them and regresses them on 
the independent variables. Statistic results are given in Table 6.3 and follow a Chi-Squared 
distribution. If the test statistic falls in the rejection region, the null of homoscedasticity, is 
rejected and heteroscedasticity is accepted. This occurs if the probability (lower of the two 
numbers) is greater than 0.05, indicating a 5% significance level. The results, displayed in Table 
6.3 indicate there is heteroscedasticity in all but one time period for one model, the net farm 
income per acre model for the period of 1998-2000. Since the results indicate that the errors do 
not exhibit constant variances, this violates one of the main assumptions (homoscedasticity) used 
to calculate OLS standard errors and are not appropriate to use.  To account for these 
fundamental violations, White’s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Variances and Standard Errors 
(robust standard errors) are applied to the OLS regression. These standard errors are calculated in 
such a way that enables changes of the variance of the error across time and across space and 
also correlation of variables within a group across time. Furthermore, robust standard errors are 
asymptotically valid but could be larger or smaller than OLS standards errors. This can cause 
variables to become insignificant with robust standard errors that were originally significant 
when estimated with uncorrected OLS standard errors and vice versa. The results of the 
regressions of the pure grain farms are presented and discussed next followed by those 
regressions within each time period. 
 
 
  
78 
 
6.3 Results for All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois  
     This section presents the results of the three profitability measures for the entire dataset of 
pure grain farms in Illinois spanning from 1996 to 2009. These results explain what drives the 
variation in these return measures and hence, the main drivers of changes in returns. Here the 
expectations are compared to the actual results and conclusions are drawn on.  Table 6.4 shows 
the results of the net farm income per acre model (nfiperacre) and the contributions of each 
independent variable to changes in this profit measure. Overall, this model is significant as the F-
statistic is 397.45 with 23 degrees of freedom for the numerator and 2,300 degrees of freedom 
for the denominator with a p-value of 0.00. Since 397.45 is larger than the critical value of 1.53 it 
fall in the rejection region at the 95% confidence level and the null is rejected. Here, the null is 
that each coefficient other than the intercept is simultaneously equal to zero, meaning that all of 
the independent variables combined do not explain any variation in net farm income per acre. 
Since the null is rejected, it is concluded that the model is significant and does explain some of 
the variation in net farm income per acre.  
     The amount of variation explained by the model is shown by the overall R-squared. This 
model’s overall R-squared is 0.59 which indicates it explains 59% of the variation in net farm 
income per acre. The R-squared within the farm ID groups explains 65% of the variation while 
51% is explained between the groups. This model had 10,344 observations with 2,301 grouping 
on the farm ID. Hence, there are 2,301 farms being analyzed in this dataset with an average of 
4.5 years of financial documentation. The minimum documentation length is one year while the 
maximum is fourteen years or complete financial documentation from 1996 to 2009.      
     The bottom section of Table 6.4 shows the coefficients each of the independent variables 
along with the corresponding standard errors directly below each coefficient. The structural 
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independent variables will be assessed first followed by the control independent variables. One, 
two, and three stars next to coefficient values denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% significance levels, respectively.   
     The results indicate da is significant at the 1% level and an addition unit of da (debt-to-asset) 
will yield $33.99 less in net farm income per acre. Since, da is valued as a fraction of assets an 
additional unit would be increasing it 100%. More practically, an increase of the D/A ratio by 
1% is expected to yield a decrease in net farm income per acre of $0.34. This agrees with the 
expectation of this variable as interest expenses are included and would reduce net farm income 
per acre. Also, this relationship is in concurrence of Mishra et al. (1999) where they concluded 
that a lower D/A ratio “could increase the profitability of limited resources farms” when 
measuring net farm income per acre. (Mishra, El-Osta and Steele 1999) 
     The variables dumshare75 and dumshare5075 capture share rental impacts. Dumshare75, is 
significant at the 1% level and is a positive contributor to net farm income per acre. A farm that 
share leases over 75% of tillable acre is expected to yield $25.79 more per acre in net farm 
income than the “base” case farm who share lease less than 50%, cash rent less than 50%,  and 
owns less than 40% of their land. Furthermore, if a farm share leased 50-75% of their land, that 
entity is expected to yield $11.01 more in net farm income per acre than the baseline scenario of 
a well diversified tenure position. These results are in concurrence with Garcia et al. (1980), 
Ellinger and Barry (1987), and Purdy et al. (1997) where they all conclude that land ownership is 
inversely related to profitability. Hence, share leasing is found to be more profitable than the 
baseline. Analysis of the rest of the tenure variables shows the profitability of each relative to the 
other groups. The magnitude of these coefficients make intuitive sense as share leasing is 
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profitable. Therefore, the higher percentage of acres an operation has share leased, the higher net 
farm income per acres is expected.  
     The variables dumcash75 and dumcash5075 capture cash rent impacts. Dumcash75 is 
significant at the 1% level, however, it has a negative effect on net farm income per acre. Farms 
that cash rent more than 75% of their tillable acres can expect to receive $22.72 less per acre 
than “base” case farms. And farms that cash rent 50-75% of tillable cares are expected to receive 
$8.76 less than farms that have less than 50% share leased, 50% cash rented, and 40% owned. As 
stated in the methodology chapter, there are no expectations for each of these tenure positions, as 
analyzing all three of them separately is much different than analyzing rented versus owned 
acres. The results of cash rented acres contrasts all previous literature analyzed in Chapter 2, 
where rental agreements are found to result in higher profitability. While cash renting is a form 
of rental agreements, none of the previous literature analyzed share leasing and cash renting 
separately to see if their contribution towards profits were different. The effect of cash renting on 
other profit measures is analyzed later in this chapter. 
     The last of the tenure variables corresponds to farms that own more than 40% of the tillable 
acres. Here, dumowned40 is significant at the 5% level and is expected to increase the net farm 
income by $14.11per acre. This counters the research of Reimbaeva et al. that concluded land 
ownership is not a significant factor of profitability and also the rest of the research that 
concluded than land ownership was detrimental to returns.  While the magnitude is not as great 
as share leasing, and hence, owning land is not as lucrative as share leasing, it is more profitable 
than cash renting. Overall, from 1996-2009 share leasing is found to be the most profitable 
tenure position. However, further regression analysis will indicate if this relationship persists 
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throughout different time periods. This analysis on net farm income will be provided later in this 
chapter with Table 6.7.  
     The next structure variable is the first of the expense variables and measures the total power 
costs per acre. Here, powtotal is significant at the 1% level. Since both variables are measured in 
dollars per acre, an additional $1.00 spent on power cost is expected to decrease net farm income 
by $1.06. This is a great example of diminishing marginal utility of capital whereby spending 
another dollar does not result in a return over that dollar spent. This relationship is in 
concurrence of this variable’s expectation as it is associated with an expense. As indicated in a 
study by Mishra et al., the most efficient way of becoming more profitable is to control expenses 
such as these.  
     The next variable associated with expenses is hireperc. This is the percentage of power costs 
spent on leasing and hiring machinery. In this model, the variable is insignificant indicating that 
it is irrelevant whether an operator hires or leases out their machinery on things such as custom 
anhydrous application or whether they buy equipment and perform the application. The extra 
time management, typically the operator, spends performing duties that could be hired out is not 
captured by higher profitability. This shows there is not a great difference between buying and 
leasing equipment or even hiring out custom work. In terms of a farm operator, this should result 
in them leasing and hiring machinery to free their time and management resources.  
     The rest of the variables correspond to control independent variables that account for 
differences from farm-to-farm and year-to-year. These variables allow more accurate 
interpretations on variables that are central to this study -- those dealing with financial structure. 
The first of these control variables is the soil productivity rating (spr). In this model, the spr is 
not significant indicating that from 1996-2009 the quality of soil has not been a significant driver 
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of profits. While this is contrary to popular belief, many things could account for this not being 
significant. Namely, the high price of good soil could have internalized the possible returns from 
better yields so that it is not a significant factor. This result contrasts those of Mishra et al. (1999) 
where they found that soil productivity was statistically significant to increase net farm income 
of limited resource farms. 
     The next of the control variables corresponds to farm size. Here, this study is centered on the 
financial structure of the farm, so factors such as economy of scale must be taken into 
consideration even if the results are not key to the analysis. The variable that corresponds to size, 
hundsoftilacr, is measured in hundreds of tillable acres. The results indicate that if an operator 
increases the farm size by 100 acres, net farm income is expected to decrease by $0.88 per acre. 
Since this variable is significant at the 5% level, this refutes previous research that concludes 
both there is a positive effect of size referred to as economies of scale and conversely that farm 
size is insignificant. Again, this could show the mismanagement of farms where operators are 
concerned with growing instead of becoming more profitable with what they have or it could 
show the ability to accept lower returns per acre. Furthermore, it could show sample variability 
or lower intensity in the South, along with many other inferences. The attraction of becoming 
larger may result in lower margins with lower returns per acre but an increase in overall net farm 
income.  
     The last of the independent variables correspond to the dummy variables generated for each 
year of data. The most recent year, 2009, was set as the baseline for the analysis of the entire 
dataset. Hence, each coefficient of the dummy variable indicates the average return of that year 
in relation to 2009. The results indicate that each of these dummy variables denoting a year is 
significant at explaining the variation of net farm income at the 1% level. Net farm income per 
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acre from 1996-2006 was lower than in 2009. Furthermore, returns in 2007 and 2008 were larger 
than 2009. Also, the constant term indicates that the average net farm income per acre was 
$261.93 in 2009 holding all else constant. The profitability in terms of net farm income per acre 
is discussed in more depth through analysis of different time periods.  
     Table 6.5 provides the same analysis for return on assets. The structure and control 
independent variables and the estimation procedure are the same for the return of assets model as 
they are for the net farm income per acre model. The F-statistic for the ROA model is 45.18 with 
23 degrees of freedom for the numerator and 2,284 for the denominator with a p-value of 0.00. 
This F-stat of 45.18 is greater than the critical value of 1.53, meaning the null of no significant 
value is rejected. The overall R-squared is 0.085, meaning that 8.5% of the variation in return on 
assets is explained by this model. There is 32% explained within each farm but only 0.23% 
between the farms.  There are 10,109 observations and 2,284 farms represented by this model. 
This is fewer observations and farms than in the net farm income per acre model as some of the 
farms have null values for some of the components of the return on assets calculation. Therefore, 
those entries are not included in this analysis.  
     The bottom section of Table 6.5 lists the coefficient of the structural and control variables and 
the corresponding standard errors below. The first variable, da, shows how leverage affects a 
farm’s return on assets. The results indicate that this variable is significant in explaining the 
variation in return on assets at the 5% level. For an additional unit of da, the return on assets is 
expected to decrease 101%. In more practical terms, if the operation’s D/A ratio increased by 
1%, the return to assets is expected to decrease by 1.01%. This outcome disagrees with the 
expectation that this variable should be zero as the way the type of funding of assets should not 
affect return to assets. Furthermore, this result opposes Adhikari et al., who concludes that more 
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leveraged farms experience higher profitability in their analysis of ROA.  However, this result 
does agree with the sign of the coefficient from the net farm income per acre model.  
     The ROA model is also ran without the D/A ratio as an independent variable. There is some 
concern about the specification of the two being divided by the amount of assets, hence, results 
without D/A are presented in Table A.21. The significance and magnitude of the variables are 
very similar to the model including D/A. The only difference is the significance of the overall 
model explaining only 2.2% of the variation compared to the 32.3% when including the D/A 
ratio.  
     The next five variables are associated with the tenure positions. None are significant in 
explaining the variation in return on assets. While the sign and magnitude of these coefficients 
went with the expectations they were insignificant. The difference in asset holdings of different 
types of tenure may explain these results. These tenure position’s effects on return on assets is 
further analyzed by time period in Table 6.8, later in this chapter.  
     The next two variables, powtotal and hireperc are associated with the power expenses of the 
farming operation. Powtotal is the amount of power costs per acre stated in dollars per acre and 
is significant at the 1% level. The results show that a dollar increase in powtotal is expected to 
result in 0.07% decrease in return on assets. Again, this agrees with expectations as it is 
associated with an expense and with the results from the net farm income per acre model. The 
next variable, hireperc, is again insignificant in this model. The variable is the percent of power 
costs that are associated with leasing or hiring machinery. This further supports the findings in 
the first model that the decision whether or not to lease or buy equipment is not a significant 
driver of profitability. This also has implications on financial management as hiring some of the 
  
85 
 
more specialized aspects, such as anhydrous and fungicide application, will free an operator’s 
time. This will allow them to focus on other aspects of the operation, such as cost control.  
     Spr, is insignificant in this model, implying there are more important factors to profitability 
than productivity of the land. The next variable, hundsoftilacr, is significant at the 1% level. For 
an additional hundred acres of tillable land, it is expected that return to assets will increase by 
0.5%. This agrees with the expectation that farms experience economies of scale with a larger 
operation. Previous research such as Purdy et al (1997) also documents this relationship of 
increased financial performance with larger farms. However, the research results of Garcia et al. 
indicate that farm size is not a major factor in determining financial performance.  
     All of these dummy variables are significant except for the one corresponding to 2005 in the 
return on assets model. It is interesting to note the return on assets is greater than 2009 for each 
year. This could be due to the high asset valuation as land prices have increased significantly. 
This gradual decrease in return on assets will be further discussed in this chapter with Table 6.8 
that displays regression analysis results for three time periods within the dataset analyzed here.  
     Table 6.6 presents regression results for the return on equity model. Again, all of the 
independent variables and the econometrics used remained the same as the previous two models 
but a new dependent variable was introduced. The F-statistic for the overall significance of the 
model is 34.85 with a corresponding p-value of 0.00. This F-stat is larger than the critical value 
of 1.5 for twenty-three degrees of freedom in the numerator and 2,300 in the denominator. 
Hence, the null of all coefficients simultaneously equaling zero is rejected and the model is 
concluded to be significant. However, the overall R-squared is only 0.014 meaning that only 
1.4% of the variation in return on equity is explained by this model. There is 1.8% of the 
variation in ROE explained within the farm ID groupings and 1.2% between the groupings. 
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While one of the main motivations of this model is to contrast the return to assets model, the 
analysis of the individual time periods provides additional explanation of the variation in return 
on equity.  
     As before, this model is the same as the previous two however, the independent variables are 
regressed on return on equity. The level of significance of the structure and control independent 
variables are lacking in this model compared to the return on assets model and especially the net 
farm income per acre. The variable associated with the level of leverage is insignificant in this 
model. This is surprising as one minus this number would give you the relative amount of equity 
in terms of assets. The sign is negative as seen in the first two models, however, nothing is 
implied by this variable’s coefficient.  
      The next five dummy variables associated with tenure positions are also insignificant in the 
return on equity model. The results are surprising as different tenure positions usually have 
different implications when it comes to financial structure. The magnitude of the coefficients 
infers that owning land results in a higher return on equity but the insignificance of the 
coefficients nullifies the implications. Powtotal is the only structural variable that is significant 
in this model. An increase of $1.00 in power expense is expected to result in 0.12% lower return 
on equity. Again, this agrees with the expectation as this variable is associated with a cost. As in 
the first two models, the percentage of power costs devoted to leasing and hiring machinery 
(hireperc) is not significant in explaining the variation in the profitability of pure grain farms in 
Illinois.  
     The soil productivity is insignificant as is the case with the previous two models. This 
variable becomes significant at the 1% level later in the analysis within the different time 
periods. The variable that corresponds to farm size (hundsoftilacr) in hundreds of acres is 
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significant at the 5% level. Return on equity is expected to increase by 0.47% for each additional 
hundred tillable acres. This is in concurrence with expectations and other previous research such 
as Purdy et al. (1997).  
     The rest of the variables correspond to dummy variables for each year and experience limited 
significance in the return on equity model. The variables that correspond to 1996, 1997, 2004, 
2007, and 2008 have coefficients that are significant at explaining the variation in return on 
equity. There are many unknown and immeasurable factors captured within these dummy 
variables, hence, any interpretations may be a stretch. However, the years that are significant 
here are captured within each of the individual time periods and will be analyzed separately later 
in this chapter.  
6.4 Time Period Subset Results  
     This section provides an analysis of the relationships discussed above through time. 
Previously, these relationships spanned the dataset from 1996 to 2009. Here, the dataset has been 
split up into subsamples of three-year periods. The time periods analyzed here are 1998-2000 
which illustrates a depressed corn and soybean pricing period, 2002-2004 which illustrates a 
“normal” pre-ethanol pricing period, and 2007-2009 illustrates a post-ethanol period 
characterized by high prices.  The trends of these variables are summarized and analyzed in 
Chapter 5 throughout time and in different groupings of other independent variables. The 
regression analysis within each of these time periods shows if the relationships found earlier 
persist through time and within these subsamples. The significance and magnitude of these 
coefficients are analyzed and compared across time and against the models from the entire 
dataset. Again, since these datasets are three-year averages the time component has been 
removed. Hence, these are no longer panel datasets and more simplistic econometric approaches 
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can be taken. This section of regression analysis will make use of ordinary least squares with 
robust standard errors.  
     Table 6.7 corresponds to the first table in the analysis of the three time periods. Here, net farm 
income per acre is analyzed among each farm’s three-year averages during 1998-2000, 2002-
2004, and 2007 -2009.  Each regression corresponding to each time period is run separately and 
the results are compared. The results indicate that each of the models is significant overall as 
each of the p-values is near zero. This means the null hypothesis, which states each of the 
independent variables is simultaneously equal to zero, is rejected and the model is deemed 
significant overall. This indicates that the overall model explains some of the variability of net 
farm income per acre in each of these time periods. The R-squares show how much of this 
variation is explained. The model corresponding to 1998-2000 has an R-squared of 0.41, 
meaning that 41% of the variation in net farm income per acre is explained by the model. 
Likewise, 50% and 39% are explained in the 2002-2004 and 2007-2009 models, respectively. 
The sample size here indicates how many farm’s three-year averages were analyzed. Unlike the 
pooled data, there is not an observation per farm per year in these datasets. There are 232, 355, 
and 486 farms analyzed in 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009 subsamples, respectively. 
    The first variable, da, is significant at the 1% level in all three models. The magnitude of the 
coefficient (-71.57 and -65.83) remained similar between the 1998-2000 and 2002-2004 time 
periods. However, the coefficient decreased significantly for the 2007-2009 time period to -
171.63. Hence, for a one unit increase in the D/A ratio it is expected that net farm income per 
acre will fall by $171.63. More practically, a 1% increase in the D/A is expected to result in a 
decrease of $1.72 decrease in net farm income per acre. While the signs and significance remain 
the same across models, the magnitude of the 2007-2009 is much greater. This makes sense 
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intuitively as the returns for this period were of much greater magnitude than during 1998 to 
2000 and 2002 to 2004. These results also go along with the model spanning the entire time span 
that had a coefficient of -33.99. While again the magnitude is different the contribution towards 
profits is in the same direction. Hence, an operator trying to maximize net farm income per acre 
should not have a high D/A ratio. Whether this means rent land or hire and lease equipment is 
assessed later in this analysis.  
     The next five variables correspond to the tenure position of each farm. These farms are sorted 
into groups using dummy variables to denote different percentages of share leasing, cash renting, 
or ownership of the land operated on. The first tenure dumshare75 is generated for farms with 
over 75% of their tillable acres in share leasing agreements. This is the only tenure variable that 
is significant at the 5% level throughout each of the three time periods for the net farm income 
per acre model. This variable also had the highest positive coefficient for the 1998-2000 and 
2002-2004 models indicating that this tenure position was the most profitable during those two 
time periods. This agrees with the pooled model where share leasing was also found to be the 
most profitable tenure position. The magnitude of this variable has remained relatively steady 
throughout time at $18.62, $22.89, and $19.09 additional dollars per acre for farms that share 
leased over 75% of tillable acres during 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009, respectively. 
The other tenure variable, dunshare5075, corresponding to share leasing 50-75% of tillable acres 
was not significant is any of the three time periods. 
     The next of the tenure variable, dumcash75 corresponds to farms that cash rent 75% or more 
of their tillable acres. This variable is only significant at the 5% level for the 2002-2004 and 
2007-2009 time periods. An operator who cash rents 75% or more of their tillable acres can 
expect $17.31 and $22.75 less per acre than the baseline tenure position. The baseline position is 
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those farms that share lease less than 50%, cash rent less than 50%, and own less than 40% of 
their tillable acres. This illustrates a farm that is well diversified in their tenure position whose 
returns are not dominated by a certain type of tenure. These results oppose the other studies that 
conclude rental agreements are more profitable. While share leasing has shown to be more 
profitable, cash renting has not. Again, the other tenure position, dumcash5075, corresponding to 
farms that cash rent 50-75% of tillable acres, was not shown to be statistically significant in 
explaining the variation of net farm income per acre in any of the three time periods.  
     The last of the tenure position variables, dumowned40, corresponds to those farms that own 
40% or more of their tillable acres. This variable was only found to be significant in the 2002-
2004 with a coefficient of 20.75. Therefore, farms that own 40% or more of their tillable acres 
can expect to yield $20.75 an acre more than the baseline farm and even more compared to those 
farms that cash rent more than 75% of their tillable acres. The magnitude of this variable is 
smaller than dumshare75 indicating that share leasing is more profitable than owning the land. 
This is in concurrence with Garcia et al (1980), Ellinger and Barry (1987), and Purdy et al. 
(1997) who conclude that owning land is inversely related to profitability. However, these 
studies compare all rental agreements in general to owned acres and it is now clear this should 
not be the case. Share leasing land versus cash renting has vastly different results on profitability 
as shown here and in the pooled dataset.   
     The next two variables are associated with the power costs of farming. The first variable, 
powtotal, is the dollar amount of power costs per acre. This variable is shown to be significant in 
each of the three time periods. The first two time period’s (1998-2000 and 2002-2004) powtotal 
coefficients are below -1.00 at -1.12 and -1.27. Hence, an additional dollar spent on power costs 
is expected to result in a decrease of net farm income per acre of $1.12 and $1.27 for 1998-2000 
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and 2002-2004, respectively. This shows the diminishing returns to capital as a dollar spent 
translates into more than a decrease of a dollar in profits. On the other hand, the powtotal 
coefficient for 2007-2009 is -0.80. This means an additional dollar spent on power costs is 
expected to yield a decrease of $0.80 in net farm income per acre. Hence, if you spend a dollar, a 
portion ($0.20) is expected to be capitalized in returns.  Spending money on fixed power costs 
could be a great management decision, as the operation may recoup these funds in years to come. 
The next variable, hireperc, shows the percentage of power costs spent on leasing and hiring 
equipment. As shown in the pooled model, this variable is not significant in explaining the 
variation of net farm income per acre. As stated before, this should indicate to operators that 
hiring more duties out and focusing on things such as financial structure and cost control is a 
feasible strategic move.  
     The next variable is spr. All previous models spanning 1996-2009 show this variable to be 
insignificant however; here it is significant at the 1% level in each of the three time periods. An 
increase in the spr by one unit is expected to result in an increased net farm income of $1.10, 
$0.72, and $1.62 for the 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009 time periods, respectively. 
While this contrasts the previous net farm income model, it agrees with the expectation of this 
variable. It is expected that more productive soil will result in higher yields and hence, higher 
revenues and returns. The magnitude of the coefficient associated with the 1998-2000 versus the 
2007-2009 (1.10 vs. 1.62) or the 2002-2004 versus 2007-2009 (0.72 vs. 1.62) makes sense 
intuitively as higher prices during 2007-2009 would result in a higher relative contribution to net 
farm income per acre. However, it is unknown why the spr coefficient in the 2002-2004 model is 
smaller than in the 1998-2000 model. It could be that an increase in fertilizer usage and hybrid 
seed have taken some of the significance away from soil quality and allowed farms all over to 
  
92 
 
obtain similar profits. The sign and contribution of soil productivity in these models is in 
concurrence with the research of Mishra et al. who concluded soil productivity is significant to 
increase net farm income of limited resource farms.   
     The last of the independent variables is the size of the farm operation measured in hundreds 
of tillable acres (hundsoftilacr). This variable is insignificant in each of the three time periods. 
While this variable is significant in explaining net farm income per acre in the pooled dataset, it 
is not within each of the three-year periods. This indicates there were no economies of scale 
experienced within each of these periods. This is in concurrence with Garcia et al. (1980) whose 
results indicated that farm size is not a major factor in determining farm profitability. While it is 
not a major factor for net farm income per acre, its effects on other profitability measures within 
these time periods will be assessed later in this chapter.  
     Table 6.8 presents the regression results for the return on asset models within each time 
period. The same independent variables and subsamples of the dataset are analyzed here using a 
different dependent variable. Each of the models has a p-value near zero showing that the overall 
model is significant in explaining some of the variation in return on assets within these time 
periods. The R-squared are 0.1836, 0.2820, and 0.1789 for the 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-
2009 periods, respectively. This means that 18.36%, 28.20%, and 17.89% of the variation of 
return on equity is explained within each of these models. As before, ordinary least squares with 
robust standard errors is used to estimate the coefficients and their level of significance.  
     The first variable corresponding to the debt-to-asset ratio (da) is significant only in the 2002-
2004 time period and is so at the 1% level. The results indicate that a 1% increase in the debt-to-
asset ratio is expected to result in an increase in the return on assets of 0.09%. This result 
opposes the previous analysis of the entire time period of 1996-2009, however, it agrees with 
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previous research of the debt-to-asset ratio. Adhikari et al. concluded that more leveraged farms 
experience higher profitability in their analysis of ROA. The sign and magnitude of this 
coefficient is much different here during 2002-2004 compared to the entire time period. 
Although it is not significant, the same result appears with da in terms of the return on equity in 
Table 6.9 later in this chapter.  
     The first of the tenure variables, dumshare75, is significant at the 5% level during 2002-2004 
and at the 1% level during 2007-2009. If a farm does share lease more than 75%, the return on 
assets is expected to be 1.70% and 2.33% larger than that of the baseline farm for the 2002-2004 
and 2007-2009 time periods, respectively. Again, the baseline tenure position is a farm with less 
than 50% share leased acres, less than 50% cash rented acres, and less than 40% of the acres 
owned. The other variable that corresponds to share leasing 50-75% of the tillable acres 
(dunshare5075) is also significant at the 5% level for the 2002-2004 and 2007-2009 time 
periods. Farms that share lease 50-75% of their tillable acres are expected to have 1.9% and 
1.4% higher return on assets than the baseline tenure position for the 2002-2004 and 2007-2009 
time periods, respectively.   
     The next variables correspond with cash renting over 75% (dumcash5075) and cash renting 
50-75% (dumshare5075) of tillable acre. Here, cash renting more than 75% is significant at the 
5% level for the time period 2002-2004 and significant at the 1% level for 2007-2009. Farms that 
have more than 75% of their acres cash rented can expect 2.25% and 2.68% increases in return 
on equity compared to the baseline tenure position in the time periods 2002-2004 and 2007-
2009, respectively. On the other hand, dumcash5075 is not significant in explaining the variation 
in return on assets. Furthermore, dumowned40 is not significant in any of the three periods for 
the return on equity model. Overall, this model shows that the rental agreements (share leasing 
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and cash renting) are more profitable than owning land in terms of return on assets. This does not 
agree with the results from the dataset spanning from 1996-2009, where cash renting followed by 
owning land were the most profitable. However, it does agree with previous research by Garcia 
et al. (1980), Ellinger and Barry (1987), and Purdy et al. (1997) that found that land ownership is 
inversely related to profitability.  
     Powtotal is significant in each of the three time periods at the 1% level. For an additional 
dollar spent on power costs per acre you can expect return on assets to decrease by 0.1%, 0.09%, 
and 0.04% for the 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009 time periods, respectively. This agrees 
with the results from the entire time period that indicate a 0.07% decrease in ROA for an 
additional dollar per acre spent on power costs. This agrees with the expectation that higher costs 
per acre would decrease ROA. Hireperc is shown to be insignificant again throughout each of 
these time periods. As in the return on asset model for 1996-2009, the percentage of power costs 
devoted to hiring and leasing equipment is not significant in explaining the variation of return on 
assets.  
   Spr is insignificant in explaining the variation of return on assets as was the case in the model 
spanning from 1996-2009. This goes against expectations that more productive soil should result 
in higher profits. However, higher profits are shown in the net farm income per acre model 
within these three time periods. The second variable measures the size of the farm in hundreds of 
tillable acres (hundsoftilacr). This variable is significant at the 1% during 2007-2009; however, 
this is the only time period in which it is significant. For an additional hundred tillable acres you 
can expect return on assets to increase by 0.2%.  Again, this shows that economies of scale exist 
in this period where larger farms are shown to be more profitable. This result is in concurrence of 
Purdy et al. (1997) where they found that increases in farm size had a positive effect on financial 
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performance. The previous analysis within the three time periods will be recreated below in 
terms of return on equity.  
     Table 6.9 continues the regression analysis within each of the three-year periods for return on 
equity. As before, OLS with robust standard errors were utilized to obtain estimates and their 
level of significance. The three models associated with each time period from 1998-2000, 2002-
2004, and 2007-2009 are estimated separately and the results of each are contrasted. Each of the 
models significant overall in explaining the variation in return on equity as the p-values are near 
zero. The R-squareds are 0.2653, 0.2319, and 0.3928. This means that 26.5%, 23.2%, and 39.3% 
of the variation in return on equity is explained by the model for the 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 
2007-2009 time periods, respectively.  
      The first variable, da, is significant at the 1% level in all three time periods. The coefficients 
are 0.1439, 0.3449, and 0.3024 for the 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009 time periods, 
respectively. Hence, for a 1% increase in debt-to-asset ratio is expected to result in an increase of 
.14%, .35%, and .3% in return on equity for the each time period (in ascending order). This 
variable was not significant in the model spanning 1996-2009 so by looking at a smaller time 
period it became significant. This goes with the expectation that more leveraged farms will have 
higher return on equity as the returns are divided by relatively smaller equity and higher relative 
debt. The results with this variable oppose Purdy et al. (1997) as they found that leverage had an 
inverse relationship with mean return on equity.  
     The only tenure position that is significant in the 1998-2000 time period is share leasing with 
dumshare75 and dumshare5075 significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Farms that 
share lease over 75% of their tillable acres are expected to have a return on equity 4.7% greater 
than the baseline tenure position. Likewise, farms that share lease 50-75% of their tillable acres 
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are expected to have return on equity 4.3% greater than farms with the baseline tenure position. 
The 2002-2004 model did not show any significance in the tenure positions in regard to return on 
equity, as was the case in the model spanning 1996-2009. However, during 2007-2009 all the 
tenure positions were found to be significant in explaining the variation in return on equity 
expect for dumcash5075. Dumshare75 is significant at the 1% level and has a coefficient of 
0.0399. Hence, farms in this time period that share leased more than 75% of their tillable acres 
are expected to have 4% higher return on equity than the baseline tenure position. Furthermore, 
dumshare5075 indicates that farms share leasing 50-75% of tillable acres are expected to have 
2% greater return on equity than farms with the baseline tenure position. The other tenure 
position variable, dumcash75, indicates that farms who cash rent more than 75% of tillable acres 
are expected to have a ROE 3.3% higher than the baseline tenure position. Again, the baseline 
tenure scenario is less than 50% share leased tillable acres, less than 50% cash rented tillable 
acres, and less than 40% owned acres. The last tenure position corresponds to owning over 40% 
of tillable acres (dumowned40) and is expected to result in a decrease of 1.8% in ROA compared 
to the baseline scenario. Overall, this shows that rental agreements are more profitable in the 
2007-2009 period in terms of ROE. This makes sense conceptually as farms who rent most of 
their tillable acres are not concerned with building equity in land compared to people who own 
more than 40% of their tillable acres. This would expand the equity base decreasing ROE as net 
farm income is divided by a larger number. This agrees with research from Garcia et al. (1980), 
Ellinger and Barry (1987), and Purdy et al. (1997) who found that land ownership is inversely 
related to profitability.  
    Powtotal, is significant at the 1% in each of the periods. The results indicates that a one dollar 
increase in power expenses per acres is expected to result in a decrease of 0.12%, 0.21%, and 
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0.73% in the ROE for the time periods of 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009, respectively. 
This agrees with the results for the entire time period as well as the expectations as this variable 
corresponds to an expense. The next variable, hireperc, corresponds with the percentage of 
power costs spent on hiring and leasing machinery and is not significant in any of the time 
periods. This has been the case with this variable in each of the other regressions. While this 
variable may seem to be irrelevant, its implications are not. It implies that operators will not be 
penalized financially for hiring out some duties or leasing machinery to operate with.  
    Spr is not significant in any of the three time periods as was the case in the model from 1996-
2009. This goes against the expectation that more productive soil results in higher yields and 
higher profits. Hence, it is expected that a higher ROE is the result. The last variable left in this 
regression is the farm size in hundreds of tillable acres (hundsoftilacr). Unlike in the model 
spanning 1996-2009, this variable is not significant in any of the three time periods. This result is 
in concurrence with Garcia et al. who indicates that farm size is not a major factor in determining 
profitability. The next section will summarize the contribution and significance of the 
independent variables for the three models within the three time periods and the entire dataset 
spanning 1996-2009.   
6.5 Results Summary  
     The regressions summarized in this chapter have findings that are not apparent in previous 
studies. While the sign and significance of many of the independent variables change between 
profitability measures, overall relationships are apparent. The first structure variable, da, 
corresponds to the D/A ratio. This variable changes both sign and significance between the profit 
measures and within the time periods. This leverage ratio negatively affects returns when they 
are stated in terms of assets as in the net farm income per acre model and the ROA model. This 
  
98 
 
relationship is also present in the analysis by time period in the net farm income per acre models. 
However, the D/A ratio has a positive effect on returns during 2002-2004 for the return on asset 
model. While this goes against the model spanning from 1996-2009, it does agree with previous 
research that indicates more leveraged farms are expected to have higher return on assets and 
equity. This positive effect of leverage on return on equity is shown in each of the three time 
periods and is significant at the 1% level. Hence, depending on the profitability measure 
management is focused on and the vision of the business, the amount of leverage may be very 
different.  
     The next group of variables closely tied to the financial structure of the farm is the tenure 
position. Again, there are changes of the significance and sign of these variables between profit 
measures and time periods. While all of the variables are significant in the net farm income per 
acre model spanning 1996-2009, the net farm income per acre model within each time period 
experiences a limited level of significance with these variables. Share leasing is shown to be the 
most profitable tenure position, followed by owning land, followed by cash renting in each of the 
net farm income per acre models. This relationship changes in the return on assets model within 
the three-year time periods as cash renting became the most profitable, followed by share 
leasing, and then owning land. The results for the return on equity model agree with the return on 
assets results for the most part. The only difference is the 2007-2009 time period where share 
leasing is found to be more profitable than cash renting in terms of return on equity. The results 
from the ROA and ROE models agree with the consensus of previous research that found land 
ownership is inversely related to profitability. While this is the case with ROA and ROE, it is not 
with net farm income per acre. 
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     The last two variables associated with financial structure deal with the power cost of the 
operation and composition of those costs. The power costs per acre (powtotal) are found to be 
significant at the 1% level in each of the twelve regressions. The coefficient for the net farm 
income per acre models is typically smaller than negative one indicating that an additional dollar 
spent on power costs is expected to result in more than a dollar decrease in profits. While a 
negative sign is expected, this relationship shows that it is detrimental beyond the dollar spent on 
those costs. On the other hand, 2007-2009 shows a different magnitude where an additional 
dollar spent results in a decrease of $0.80 in net farm income per acre. This shows that additional 
power costs can potentially be a benefit if the resulting income lasts more than a year in 
situations such as fixed cost expenditures. The inverse relationship with profits also develops in 
the ROA model. As expected, the effect of an additional dollar spent decreases as the time 
periods became increasingly profitable due to higher commodity prices. Hence, each dollar of 
expenses corresponds to a smaller portion of return of assets. Conversely, the magnitude of the 
coefficients increased through time in the ROE model. This may be due to the falling relative 
debt levels throughout time or the fact that this time period is more sensitive to financial 
structure. Evidence of this is in the small constant coefficient and larger independent variable 
coefficients.    
     The second of the variables associated with costs shows the portion of power expenses spent 
on hiring or leasing machinery. This variable is insignificant in each model analyzed, and holds 
major management implications. The insignificance of this variable implies that hiring out 
machinery or leasing machinery to perform duties on the farm is not detrimental to profits. This 
is surprising as the labor to perform these duties is typically the operator whose management 
expenses are not taken into account in these profitability measures. By introducing a new 
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expense, it is expected that profits will decrease, however, this is not the case. Hence, it is 
beneficial to hire out more of these duties which would allow the operator/manager to focus on 
things such as risk management, marketing, and cost control.   
    The next control variable, hundsoftilacr, corresponds to farm size in hundreds of acres. This 
variable is significant in each of the profit models spanning 1996-2009. However, it is only 
significant in the 2007-2009 return on assets model when analyzed within the three-year time 
periods. As previous research stated larger farms experience greater returns on assets and equity 
showing economies of scale. However, larger farm size decreases net farm income per acre. This 
indicates that operators are willing to accept lower return per acre to grow their farm and 
absolute net farm income. This begs the question “is it more feasible from a management 
standpoint to increase the returns on existing acres or expand and accept less per acre?” 
     The last set of control variables correspond to unobservable factors specific to each year. 
Dummy variables are made for each year from 1996-2008, leaving out 2009 to act as a baseline. 
These variables are only included in the evaluation of the entire time period as the subsamples 
correspond to three year averages. The results indicate that these dummy variables are significant 
at the 1% level in net farm income per acre model. It is hypothesized that the majority of the 
significance lies in the prices received however; factors such as yield, weather, and government 
policy also have a large affect.  The ROA results indicate that all year dummies except for 2005 
were significant while the ROE only showed significance for 1996, 1997, 2004, 2007, and 2008. 
This is a good indication as each of these years is included in the time period analysis where 
fundamental differences are hypothesized to occur. The next chapter will discuss these results in 
terms of the thesis objectives as well as implications, further research ideas, and limitations of 
this research.  
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6.6 Graphs 
Table 6. 1     Multicollinearity Test, Variance Inflation Factors APG 
 
 
 
 
 
Multicollinearity Test 
Variance Inflation Factors 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Variable VIF 1/VIF
spr 27.8 0.04
powtotal 7.4 0.14
dumshare75 4.1 0.24
hundsofacr~l 4.0 0.25
dumshare5075 3.0 0.33
da 2.9 0.35
dumcash5075 2.4 0.41
dumcash75 2.4 0.41
dum05 2.3 0.44
dum04 2.3 0.44
dum07 2.3 0.45
dum06 2.2 0.46
dum03 2.2 0.47
dum08 2.1 0.47
dumowned40 2.0 0.49
dum02 2.0 0.51
dum01 1.9 0.53
dum00 1.9 0.53
dum99 1.8 0.56
hireperc 1.8 0.56
dum98 1.7 0.59
dum97 1.7 0.60
dum96 1.6 0.61
Mean VIF 3.6
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Table 6. 2     Multicollinearity Test, Variance Inflation Factors APG within Time Periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multicollinearity Test 
Variance Inflation Factors 
All Pure Grain Farms within Time Periods 
Variable VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
dumshare75 3.8 0.26 2.9 0.35 2.2 0.45
dumshare5075 2.9 0.35 2.8 0.36 2.1 0.47
dumcash75 2.1 0.48 2.1 0.47 2.1 0.48
dumowned40 2.1 0.48 2.0 0.49 2.0 0.50
dumcash5075 2.0 0.51 1.7 0.60 1.6 0.61
da 1.2 0.85 1.2 0.84 1.2 0.83
hireperc 1.1 0.87 1.1 0.88 1.2 0.87
powtotal 1.1 0.92 1.1 0.91 1.1 0.91
hundsofacr~l 1.1 0.92 1.1 0.93 1.1 0.92
spr 1.1 0.94 1.0 0.96 1.1 0.92
Mean VIF 1.8 1.7 1.6
2002-2004 1998-2000 2007-2009 
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Table 6. 3     Heteroscedasticity Test, Breusch-Pagan APG within Time Periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test
All Pure Grain Farms within Time Periods 
1998-2000 2002-2004 2007-2009 
Model 
NFI/acre 
     Chi2(10) 10.12 65.32 23.96
Prob > Chi2 0.43 0.00 0.01
ROA 
     Chi2(10) 96.12 53.19 58.65
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROE 
     Chi2(10) 349.93 1713.68 235.52
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
H0: Constant Variance 
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Table 6. 4     Regression Results NFI/ac., APG 96-09 
 
Regression Results for Net Farm Income/acre Model 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois (1996-2009) 
Fixed Effects with Clustered Standard Errors 
F(23,2300) 397.45
Prob> F 0.00
R-Squared 
Within 0.65
Between 0.51
Overall 0.59
Number of Observations 10344
Number of Groups 2301
Observation per Group 
Min 1
Average 4.5
Max 14
(Std. Err. Adjusted for 2301 clusters in farmid)
da -33.99 *** dum98 -126.18 ***
(9.64) (5.25)
dumshare75 25.79 *** dum99 -100.95 ***
(4.90) (4.94)
dumshare5075 11.01 *** dum00 -74.37 ***
(3.98) (4.64)
dumcash75 -22.72 *** dum01 -104.29 ***
(5.56) (4.66)
dumcash5075 -8.76 ** dum02 -98.19 ***
(3.92) (4.44)
dumowned40 14.11 ** dum03 -66.04 ***
(6.34) (4.58)
powtotal -1.06 *** dum04 -32.25 ***
(0.05) (4.39)
hireperc 8.12 dum05 -72.98 ***
(8.68) (4.27)
spr -0.32 dum06 -17.83 ***
(0.53) (4.18)
hundsoftilacr -0.88 ** dum07 144.62 ***
(0.40) (4.20)
dum96 -33.48 *** dum08 152.56 ***
(5.50) (4.73)
dum97 -64.39 *** constant 261.93 ***
(4.94) (45.70)
Sample 10344
Note: *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Variable 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  Variable 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
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Table 6. 5      Regression Results ROA, APG 96-09 
 
The specification of da interacting with ROA is in question and an alternative regression is 
presented in Table A.21 
Regression Results for Return on Assets Model 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois (1996-2009) 
Fixed Effects with Clustered Standard Errors 
F(23,2283) 45.18
Prob> F 0.00
R-Squared 
Within 0.3229
Between 0.0023
Overall 0.0848
Number of Observations 10109
Number of Groups 2284
Observation per Group 
Min 1
Average 4.4
Max 14
(Std. Err. Adjusted for 2301 clusters in farmid)
da -1.0113 ** dum98 0.1034 **
(0.4189) (0.0471)
dumshare75 -0.0119 dum99 0.1080 **
(0.0118) (0.0425)
dumshare5075 -0.0075 dum00 0.0985 ***
(0.0119) (0.0337)
dumcash75 0.0163 dum01 0.1232 **
(0.0138) (0.0497)
dumcash5075 0.0122 dum02 0.0963 **
(0.0097) (0.0419)
dumowned40 0.0007 dum03 0.0879 ***
(0.0119) (0.0339)
powtotal -0.0007 *** dum04 0.0900 ***
(0.0001) (0.0286)
hireperc 0.0331 dum05 0.0455 *
(0.0280) (0.0239)
spr 0.0024 dum06 0.0620 ***
(0.0025) (0.0180)
hundsoftilacr 0.0050 *** dum07 0.0970 ***
(0.0016) (0.0059)
dum96 0.1809 *** dum08 0.0747 ***
(0.0452) (0.0047)
dum97 0.1343 *** constant 0.1274
(0.0410) (0.2274)
Sample 10109
Note: *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Variable 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  Variable 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
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Table 6. 6     Regression Results ROE, APG 96-09 
 
Regression Results for Return on Equity Model 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois (1996-2009) 
Fixed Effects with Clustered Standard Errors 
F(23,2300) 34.85
Prob> F 0.00
R-Squared 
Within 0.0180
Between 0.0121
Overall 0.0143
Number of Observations 10344
Number of Groups 2301
Observation per Group 
Min 1
Average 4.5
Max 14
(Std. Err. Adjusted for 2301 clusters in farmid)
da -0.0625 dum98 -0.0446 *
(0.2138) (0.0269)
dumshare75 -0.0004 dum99 0.0217
(0.0174) (0.0235)
dumshare5075 -0.0130 dum00 0.0443
(0.0140) (0.0378)
dumcash75 0.0042 dum01 -0.0136
(0.0364) (0.0264)
dumcash5075 -0.0286 dum02 -0.0003
(0.0344) (0.0228)
dumowned40 0.0471 dum03 0.0254
(0.0475) (0.0290)
powtotal -0.0012 *** dum04 0.0572 **
0.0003 (0.0285)
hireperc -0.1197 dum05 -0.0355 *
0.2172 (0.0198)
spr 0.0008 dum06 0.0088
(0.0024) (0.0303)
hundsoftilacr 0.0047 ** dum07 0.1424 ***
(0.0019) (0.0135)
dum96 0.1138 *** dum08 0.1084 ***
(0.0295) (0.0058)
dum97 0.0581 ** constant 0.0752
(0.0255) (0.1629)
Sample 10344
Note: *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  Variable 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  Variable 
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Table 6. 7      Regression Results NFI/ac., APG within Time Periods 
 
 
Regression Results for Net Farm Income/acre
Pure Grain Farm's 3 Year Averages 
OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
F(10,221) F(10,344) F(10,475) 
12.82 19.99 23.45
Prob> F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-Squared 0.4087 0.4967 0.3869
Root MSE 34.26 37.68 63.60
1998-2000 2002-2004 2007-2009
da -71.57 *** -65.83 *** -171.63 ***
(12.44) (13.58) (18.78)
dumshare75 18.62 ** 22.89 *** 19.09 **
(8.44) (7.92) (9.71)
dumshare5075 14.38 * 7.81 12.45
(8.65) (7.80) (10.03)
dumcash75 -8.76 -17.31 ** -22.75 **
(9.65) (8.46) (10.17)
dumcash5075 5.70 -16.66 * -11.71
(9.71) (8.73) (9.49)
dumowned40 18.02 * 20.75 ** 20.43 *
(10.07) (9.32) (11.62)
powtotal -1.12 *** -1.27 *** -0.80 ***
(0.15) (0.19) (0.15)
hireperc -1.88 4.12 -8.79
(18.35) (22.12) (21.39)
spr 1.10 *** 0.72 *** 1.62 ***
(0.36) (0.24) (0.35)
hundsoftilacr 0.78 * -0.47 -0.51
(0.46) (0.33) (0.46)
constant 39.40 130.75 *** 215.44 ***
(35.81) (26.87) (36.04)
Sample 232 355 486
Note: *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
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Table 6. 8     Regression Results ROA, APG within Time Periods 
 
The specification of da interacting with ROA is in question and an alternative regression is 
presented in Table A.22 
Regression Results for Return on Assets Model 
Pure Grain Farm's 3 Year Averages 
OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
F(10,221) F(10,344) F(10,475) 
3.67 9.69 12.60
Prob> F 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
R-Squared 0.1836 0.2820 0.1789
Root MSE 0.04 0.05 0.05
1998-2000 2002-2004 2007-2009
da 0.0000 0.0914 *** 0.0281
(0.0194) (0.0157) (0.0193)
dumshare75 0.0194 * 0.0168 ** 0.0233 ***
(0.0108) (0.0083) (0.0074)
dumshare5075 0.0133 0.0187 ** 0.0142 **
(0.0113) (0.0083) (0.0070)
dumcash75 0.0227 0.0225 ** 0.0268 ***
(0.0140) (0.0112) (0.0090)
dumcash5075 0.0139 0.0489 0.0059
(0.0109) (0.0093) (0.0062)
dumowned40 0.0138 -0.0029 -0.0123
(0.0114) (0.0086) (0.0077)
powtotal -0.0010 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0004 ***
(0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0001)
hireperc 0.0286 -0.0174 -0.0176
(0.0307) (0.0211) (0.0184)
spr -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0024
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
hundsoftilacr 0.0011 * -0.0003 0.0020 ***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0062)
constant 0.1693 *** 0.1140 *** 0.1090 ***
(0.0582) (0.0305) (0.0296)
Sample 232 355 486
Note: *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
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Table 6. 9     Regression Results ROE, APG within Time Periods 
 
  
 
Regression Results for Return on Equity Model  
Pure Grain Farm's 3 Year Averages 
OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
F(10,221) F(10,344) F(10,475) 
6.20 6.21 25.75
Prob> F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-Squared 0.2653 0.2319 0.3928
Root MSE 0.07 0.16 0.07
1998-2000 2002-2004 2007-2009
da 0.1439 *** 0.3449 *** 0.3024 ***
(0.0388) (0.1307) (0.0367)
dumshare75 0.0467 *** 0.0219 0.0399 ***
(0.0179) (0.0189) (0.0111)
dumshare5075 0.0431 ** 0.0160 0.0197 **
(0.0188) (0.0233) (0.0091)
dumcash75 0.0502 * 0.0084 0.0332 ***
(0.0302) (0.0339) (0.0114)
dumcash5075 0.0232 0.0412 0.0126
(0.0196) (0.0370) (0.0091)
dumowned40 0.0216 -0.0119 -0.0183 **
(0.0179) (0.0214) (0.0093)
powtotal -0.0012 *** -0.0021 *** -0.0073 ***
(0.0024) (0.0006) (0.0001)
hireperc 0.0204 0.0196 -0.0140
(0.0414) (0.0544) (0.0221)
spr -0.0008 -0.0015 0.0002
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0004)
hundsoftilacr 0.0002 -0.0015 0.0094
(0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0007)
constant 0.1278 0.2602 * 0.0943 **
(0.0866) (0.1474) (0.0382)
Sample 232 355 486
Note: *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
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7     CONCLUSION 
 
     This chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis. The first section discusses the goals and 
objectives of the thesis and how they are met. The next section gives a brief summary of the 
conclusions made and their implications. Ideas for further research and ways to expand this 
analysis are then presented. Also in this chapter, the limitations of the study are tied with ideas to 
make this study more robust. Next, the outcomes of the objectives and goals are discussed.    
7.1 Objectives       
     The first objective of this thesis is to analyze the effects of tenure position on net farm income 
per acre, return on assets, and return on equity. As shown in the literature review in Chapter 2, 
tenure has been documented as one of the main determinants of capital structure. The 
management objectives are different for operators who control land through rental agreements 
opposed to owning the land. Operators who primarily use rental agreements are typically not 
concerned with building equity in one of the most capital intensive aspects of farming -- land. 
While it does not matter where equity resides, this could infer that operators are withdrawing 
equity out of the operation.  These operators are likely to demand smaller returns per acre in an 
attempt to grow in size and net farm income. On the other hand, operators who put an emphasis 
on land ownership are more likely to use the limited land available to maximize profits on those 
acres. This analysis is achieved by sorting the sample of farms into tenure classes based on the 
composition of their tenure position. The three types of tenure positions are cash rent, share 
lease, and ownership. These positions are stated as a portion of total tillable acres and sorted into 
groupings based on percentages.  
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     The second objective of this thesis is to analyze the effects of the debt position of the farm on 
profitability. This is achieved in the regressions by the analysis of the D/A ratio of each farm. 
The effects of this variable on different profitability measures will help make management 
decisions based on the visions of each operation. The debt position has great effects on the return 
on assets and additional financing. If an operation’s cost of capital is below the return on assets it 
is beneficial to leverage up and finance one’s operation. This shows that the operation could take 
their working capital and invest in something other than the operation, as the opportunity cost 
outweighs self-financing.  
     The third objective of this thesis is to analyze the effects of machinery ownership on a farm’s 
profitability. This is achieved through analyzing the portion of power costs that are attributed to 
hiring and leasing out equipment. The alternative is to buy the equipment and perform the work 
with the resources already hired by the operation. The significance and sign of this variable 
indicates which situation is financially beneficial. This has major implications on how the 
operator chooses to spend his/her time and deploy resources available to the operation.  
     The last thesis objective is to analyze the changes in these variables associated with capital 
structure and how they affect the profitability measures. This is achieved by the means analysis 
and regression analysis within the different time periods. The means analysis shows the trends of 
averages among variables throughout the years. Also, the means analysis shows changes of 
variables in different grouping of D/A ratio, farm size, and land ownership within each of the 
three time periods analyzed (1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009). Furthermore, the 
regression analysis shows the significance, sign, and magnitude of each variable within each of 
these time periods. This indicates if each variable explains a portion of the variation in these 
profit measures.  
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     The overall goal of this study is to identify the effects of capital structure on farm 
profitability. This analysis made use of Illinois Farm Business Farm Management’s EMA and B-
Stat database. This database spans from 1996 to 2009 and includes farm specific figures taken 
from the yearly financial statements. The methods utilized in this study are Fixed Effects with 
clustered standard errors for the three models comprised of the entire dataset of pure grain farms. 
Analysis is also performed for time periods within this dataset that experienced different levels 
of profitability due to commodity prices. The time periods utilized are 1998-2000 which 
corresponds to a depressed pricing period, 2002-2004 which corresponds to a “normal” pre-
ethanol pricing period, and 2007-2009 which corresponds to a post-ethanol pricing period that 
saw high prices. The factors examined for their impacts on capital structure are debt position, 
tenure, and machinery ownerships. 
7.2 Summary of Findings and Implications  
     As expected, the capital structure of the farm has significant impacts on the profitability. The 
factors that affect capital structure are debt position, tenure, and machinery ownership. The debt 
position is analyzed in each model with the D/A ratio. This variable is significant in the net farm 
income and ROA models spanning 1996-2009, however, not in the ROE model for this time 
period. For a 1% increase in the D/A ratio it is expected that net farm income per acre will fall by 
$0.34 and ROA by 1.01%. More specifically, a 1% increase of the D/A ratio in the 2007-2009 
time period is expected to yield a $1.71 decrease in net farm income per acre. These results 
disagree with Adhikari et al. who concluded that more leveraged farms experience higher 
profitability in their analysis of ROA. The D/A ratio is also shown to be significant in each of the 
three-year time periods in the ROE model. For a 1% increase in the D/A ratio, ROE is expected 
to increase by .014%, 0.35%, and 0.30% for 1998-2000, 2002-2004, and 2007-2009 time 
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periods, respectively. This result concurs with the expectation that relative equity goes down as 
debt goes up. Hence, net farm income gets divided by a relatively smaller number and increases 
the ratio. This also disagrees with the past findings of Purdy et al. who found that leverage has an 
inverse relationship with mean return on equity. The change of sign between the return measures 
implies operators need to carefully choose what profit measure they base their management 
decisions on. Specifically, ROE is not an appropriate measure for operators to use if they have 
the majority of tillable acres in rental agreements and do not put emphasis on building working 
capital to keep as retained earnings in the operation. On the other hand, ROA may not be as 
applicable to those farms that lease or rent all of their equipment as it will not show up on the 
balance sheet. The ROA will be inflated in those situations and not accurately portray an 
operator’s financial position. Net farm income per acre provides a dependable measure across all 
farms which is discussed in more depth in this section.  
     The next factor affecting capital structure is the tenure of land.  The three types of tenure 
(share leasing, cash renting, and ownership) are all shown to be significant in the net farm 
income per acre model spanning 1996-2009. Share leasing is the most profitable tenure type, 
followed by land ownership, then cash renting in terms of net farm income per acre. This fact is 
confirmed by the analysis of tenure within the three-year net farm income per acre averages. 
Unlike previous research we divide tenure into share rental and cash rent types. While share 
leasing, one type of rental agreement, is more profitable than land ownership, the other rental 
type (cash rent) is not. It is hypothesized that the acceptance of lower net farm per acre for cash 
renting agreements is spurred by operators wanting to increase farm size and absolute net farm 
income.  
  
114 
 
     The effects of tenure position on other measures of profitability differ from those on net farm 
income per acre. The ROA model spanning the entire time period indicates that none of the 
tenure types are significant. However, when broken down into three periods these relationships 
change again. None of the tenure positions are significant during the time period from 1998 to 
2000. However, cash renting and share leasing become significant in the 2002-2004 time period. 
Here, cash renting is the most profitable tenure position followed by share leasing. The 2007-
2009 time period results confirm this relationship as farms that cash rent 75% or more of their 
tillable acres are expected to have an ROA 2.68% greater than the baseline tenure position. The 
baseline tenure position is farms that share lease less than 50% of tillable acres, cash rent less 
than 50% of their tillable acres, and own less than 40% of tillable acres.  
     The effects of tenure position on ROE are not as clear. Tenure position was not significant on 
ROE when analyzed for the entire time period. However, limited significance is experienced 
within the three-year time periods. Share leasing is the only tenure position significant in 
explaining the variation of ROE in the 1998-2000. Return on equity is expected to be 4.67% 
larger for farms that share lease at least 75% of tillable acres and 4.31% for farms that share 
lease 50-75% in the 1998-2000 time period.  The 2007-2009 time period indicates that share 
leasing is the most profitable tenure position followed by cash renting. Each of the tenure 
positions is significant in this time period. The profitability of the rental agreements compared to 
owning land is consistent with previous research. Garcia et al. (1980), Ellinger and Barry (1987), 
and Purdy et al. (1997) found that ownership of land is inversely related to profitability. Again, 
depending on the profit measure used, the optimal type of tenure position is debatable. The 
decision to rent or buy land depends on many things such as length of business plan, interest 
rates, tax considerations, legacy of the operation, and views on retained earnings. The next 
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section will discuss further ideas to expand this study in regard to capital gains on land and land 
valuation.  
     The last factor affecting capital structure in this study is the ownership of machinery. One of 
the major decisions of an operator is whether to buy or lease equipment. Furthermore, the 
decision to hire out custom work or buy the equipment and perform the work within the 
operation is another major consideration. This factor is analyzed in the regression analysis 
through the percentage of power costs attributed to hiring and leasing machinery. The sign and 
significance of the variables shows the contribution of this variable to profits. However, hireperc 
is not significant in any of the regression analyses. This indicates there is no significant 
difference between leasing or buying machinery on profitability. This implies that each operator 
needs to analyze how to allocate resources most efficiently. If the operator is doing most of this 
work it may be feasible to hire it out and use the extra time for marketing and management 
duties. The next section discusses expanding this study to enhance the robustness and limitations 
of application.  
7.3 Further Research and Limitations  
     By design, this study is performed with a limited scope so the relationships found would be 
more precise and pertain to pure grain farms in Illinois.  One way to further this study would be 
to expand the sample geographically and compare the results to the conclusions here.  Analyzing 
additional regions of the Corn Belt with the models and methods used here will improve the 
robustness of the study and insure appropriateness for application to other regions. It will also be 
of interest to analyze some of the less predominate corn and soybean regions to see if the 
fundamental relationships change. Regions such as the southern fringe farming states like 
Louisiana, Missouri, Alabama, and Tennessee and western agriculture regions like western 
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Nebraska, western Kansas, and western North and South Dakotas can provide additional insight 
into grain production. As shown in models spanning the entire time period, the soil productivity 
rating are not significant in explaining the variation in profitability. These regions will provide 
more variation in soil productivity and allow a more robust analysis.  
   Furthermore, this study only includes corn and soybeans as these are the predominant crops in 
Illinois that offer a feasible sample size for Fixed Effects estimation.  Expansion of this study 
into addition regions introduces the potential to include other land intensive agriculture 
commodities such as wheat and sorghum. By including similar land intensive endeavors net farm 
income per acre is still applicable. This analysis can also be applied to livestock operations, 
however, net farm income per acre is not an applicable profit measure. A livestock operation’s 
management decisions should be based in relation to something other than land such as assets, 
equity, or profit per head.  
     Corn and soybean production in Illinois is a very capital intensive venture. The high capital 
requirements come from three main sources: land, equipment, and input costs. In particular, land 
prices in Illinois have experienced significant increases in the past ten years. Rental agreements 
have internalized this opportunity cost in many parts of Illinois through high cash rents. 
However, there is still hypothesized to be a disparity between these rental agreements and the 
cost of purchasing land. An interesting application of this research would be to tie it to land 
prices and cash rents. By analyzing the profitability alongside the relative pricing structures of 
ownership versus renting, the disparity could potentially be quantified. This would involve 
determining an appropriate capitalization rate as well as getting an accurate database of land 
values. The land values are discussed in more depth below as one of the limitations of the study.   
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     The topic of land values spurs an idea for further research and a limitation of this study. 
While net farm income per acre, return on assets, and returns on equity have seen record 
numbers in the recent years, there are additional non-cash gains these measures are not 
accounting for. The return on assets measure used in this study is strictly an accounting figure. It 
does not include an accurate portrayal of market condition and hence, does not show capital 
gains. In particular, the appreciation in land prices is not shown in these return measures. FBFM 
states increases in land prices conservatively and shows minimal gains in the assets, not 
reflecting market conditions. Furthermore, the database used to analyze a market return on assets 
must also contain additional data showing capital expenditures and sales. Proper documentation 
at the operator level will prevent sales of assets showing up as appreciation on other assets. The 
calculation of: ((Net Farm Income + Interest + (Ending Assets – Beginning Assets +/- Capital 
Gains/Expenditures)) / Total Assets) will show these additional gains/losses if the data used is 
robust enough. The FBFM database used in this study was not robust enough as it did not reflect 
accurate market values for land.      
7.4 Summary   
     The main objective of this study, to explain the variation in profit measures through financial 
structure, is achieved through regression and means analysis presented in this thesis. The factors 
affecting financial structure analyzed are tenure, debt structure, and machinery ownership.  
While previous research analyzed owned acres versus rented acres, this study decomposes the 
rented acres into share leasing and cash renting. This allowed comparison of the profitability 
between the two rental agreements, in addition to comparing them separately to owning the land. 
The results indicate that when measuring profitability by net farm income per acre, share leasing 
is the most profitable, followed by owning land, followed by cash renting. However, previous 
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studies are confirmed in the ROA and ROE models within the three time periods, where the two 
rental agreements are most profitable. The gradual switch from share leasing to cash renting is 
brought into question as cash renting results in the lowest net farm income per acre. This shows 
operator’s acceptance of lower returns to grow the operation and increase absolute net farm 
income.  
     The debt position of each farm also has major implications on the profitability. Previous 
research indicating that higher D/A ratios result in high profitability are confirmed in this thesis, 
but only within the ROA and ROE models within each three-year period. The net farm income 
per acre and ROA model spanning 1996 to 2009 indicate the D/A ratio has a negative effect on 
returns. This negative effect is experienced within each time period of the net farm income per 
acre models. In the 2007-2009 time period an increase of the D/A ratio by 1% is expected to 
result in a decrease in the net farm income per acre of $1.72.  The positive effect of D/A on ROE 
is explained by the decreasing equity position inflating the ROE. Hence, operators should be 
careful to increase their debt load as it is detrimental to returns stated in terms of assets.  
     Lastly, the ownership of machinery is shown to be insignificant by this study. This 
relationship is analyzed by the percent of power costs that are attributed to leasing or hiring 
machinery. It was expected that a higher percent of machinery hiring and leasing would result in 
lower returns as the operator is typically running the machinery. The operator’s labor is not 
internalized by net farm income so introducing a new expense such as hiring out duties should 
decrease returns. However, this variable is insignificant in explaining the variation in each of the 
profitability measures in each time period. This implies that operators should consider hiring out 
more duties and focus on things such as marketing and risk management. More applications of 
the methods and models used here would indicate the robustness of the relationships found. Also, 
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the addition of market-valued ROA would benefit this analysis and add a valuable dimension to 
profitability not captured here. Finding a dataset robust enough to execute this analysis is 
challenging however.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Additional Pure Grain Farm Data Analysis  
Table A. 1     Summary Stats 3-yr Averages APG 98-00 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics of 3-Year Averages 
All Pure Grain Farms 1998-2000 
ROA 8% 4% -1% 35%
ROE 7% 8% -9% 64%
nfiperacre  $             65  $           44 (65)$          214$            
tenureowned 15% 19% 0% 100%
tenurecash 25% 29% 0% 100%
tenureshare 60% 32% 0% 100%
tenureshareofrent 70% 34% 0% 100%
da 0.30 0.19 0.00 0.80
spr 86 8 60 99
acrtil 983 533 230 4647
hireperc 10% 11% 0% 69%
totalassacr 1,822$         1,128$       317$         8,330$         
currassacr 403$            211$          (19)$          1,457$         
intassacr 615$            373$          91$           3,116$         
ltassacr 804$            841$          -$          6,023$         
totaldebtacr 437$            264$          -$          1,467$         
currdebtacr 212$            131$          -$          598$            
intdebtacr 70$              68$            -$          420$            
ltdebtacr 155$            181$          -$          1,123$         
Sample 232
Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
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Table A. 2     Correlation Matrix, APG 98-00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
All Pure Grain Farms 1998-2000 
da tenureowned tenurecash tenureshareofrent spr hundsofacrtil powhireintassets hireperc
da 1
tenureowned -0.28 1
tenurecash 0.24 -0.15 1
tenureshareofrent -0.18 -0.12 -0.92 1
spr -0.19 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 1
hundsofacrtil 0.20 -0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.11 1
powhireintassets -0.42 0.32 -0.12 0.05 0.20 -0.27 1
hireperc 0.16 0.02 0.28 -0.30 -0.13 0.02 -0.12 1
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Table A. 3     Summary Stats 3-yr Averages 02-04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics of 3-Year Averages 
All Pure Grain Farms 2002-2004 
ROA 9% 6% -6% 35%
ROE 12% 18% -33% 267%
nfiperacre  $           95  $                52 (234)$             337$           
tenureowned 16% 20% 0% 100%
tenurecash 32% 30% 0% 100%
tenureshare 53% 32% 0% 100%
tenureshareofrent 62% 34% 0% 100%
da 0.34 0.21 0.00 1.52
spr 84 9 52 100
acrtil 1038 540 212 3731
hireperc 12% 13% 0% 81%
totalassacr 1,934$       1,380$            318$              11,049$      
currassacr 431$          344$               17$                3,882$        
intassacr 609$          374$               3$                  3,853$        
ltassacr 894$          985$               -$               7,632$        
totaldebtacr 498$          307$               9$                  2,023$        
currdebtacr 236$          133$               8$                  653$           
intdebtacr 73$            67$                 -$               385$           
ltdebtacr 189$          214$               -$               1,257$        
Sample 355
Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
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Table A. 4     Correlation Matrix, APG 02-04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
All Pure Grain Farms 2002-2004
da tenureowned tenurecash tenureshareofrent spr hundsofacrtil powhireintassets hireperc
da 1
tenureowned -0.35 1
tenurecash 0.27 -0.25 1
tenureshareofrent -0.18 -0.06 -0.91 1
spr -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 0.15 1
hundsofacrtil 0.24 -0.15 0.04 0.00 -0.04 1
powhireintassets -0.41 0.31 -0.13 0.02 0.05 -0.33 1
hireperc 0.13 -0.05 0.22 -0.19 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 1
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Table A. 5     Summary Stats 3-yr Averages 07-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics of 3-Year Averages 
All Pure Grain Farms 2007-2009 
ROA 13% 6% 3% 47%
ROE 14% 9% 0% 86%
nfiperacre  $          236  $               80 30$              620$             
tenureowned 17% 21% 0% 100%
tenurecash 40% 31% 0% 100%
tenureshare 43% 32% 0% 100%
tenureshareofrent 51% 36% 0% 100%
da 0.24 0.16 0.00 0.76
spr 84 9 55 99
acrtil 1125 627 183 4485
hireperc 13% 13% -1% 95%
totalassacr 2,905$        1,937$          634$            16,506$        
currassacr 781$           429$             17$              4,902$          
intassacr 781$           465$             1$                4,729$          
ltassacr 1,343$        1,542$          -$             13,889$        
totaldebtacr 571$           385$             -$             3,348$          
currdebtacr 286$           181$             -$             1,623$          
intdebtacr 81$             83$               -$             994$             
ltdebtacr 204$           253$             -$             2,275$          
Sample 486
Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
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Table A. 6     Correlation Matrix, APG 07-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
All Pure Grain Farms 2007-2009
da tenureowned tenurecash tenureshareofrent spr hundsofacrtil powhireintassets hireperc
da 1
tenureowned -0.27 1
tenurecash 0.25 -0.27 1
tenureshareofrent -0.16 -0.12 -0.88 1
spr -0.13 -0.15 -0.10 0.18 1
hundsofacrtil 0.11 -0.21 0.14 -0.06 0.04 1
powhireintassets -0.30 0.37 -0.06 -0.10 0.07 -0.27 1
hireperc 0.00 0.13 0.14 -0.19 -0.11 -0.15 0.12 1
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Table A. 7     NFI/ac. by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996  $          145  $           68 421
1997  $            94  $           65 497
1998  $            34  $           61 495
1999  $            61  $           58 567
2000  $            81  $           60 654
2001  $            47  $           58 679
2002  $            56  $           58 701
2003  $            97  $           61 838
2004  $          123  $           66 931
2005  $            81  $           72 963
2006  $          131  $           84 879
2007  $          285  $         102 959
2008  $          274  $         118 870
2009  $          118  $         116 903
Total  $          125  $         112 10357
Net Farm Income /acre by Year  
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Table A. 8     ROA by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 16% 11% 421
1997 11% 9% 496
1998 6% 6% 495
1999 9% 7% 567
2000 7% 73% 653
2001 10% 60% 678
2002 8% 7% 700
2003 10% 7% 831
2004 11% 9% 930
2005 8% 7% 963
2006 11% 8% 879
2007 17% 11% 959
2008 15% 9% 865
2009 8% 6% 673
Total 11% 25% 10110
Return on Assets by Year  
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Table A. 9     ROE by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 19% 38% 421
1997 12% 15% 496
1998 2% 37% 495
1999 8% 20% 567
2000 10% 19% 653
2001 5% 40% 678
2002 8% 21% 700
2003 12% 43% 831
2004 13% 47% 930
2005 4% 88% 963
2006 9% 120% 879
2007 21% 20% 959
2008 17% 14% 870
2009 7% 13% 903
Total 11% 52% 10345
Return on Equity by Year  
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Table A. 10     Share Leased % by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 62% 31% 421
1997 60% 32% 497
1998 60% 33% 495
1999 58% 33% 567
2000 56% 34% 654
2001 52% 34% 678
2002 52% 34% 701
2003 49% 33% 838
2004 46% 33% 931
2005 48% 33% 963
2006 44% 33% 879
2007 43% 33% 959
2008 41% 33% 870
2009 42% 33% 903
Total 49% 34% 10356
Percentage of Acres Share Leased  by Year 
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Table A. 11     Cash Rented % by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 23% 27% 421
1997 25% 28% 497
1998 25% 29% 495
1999 25% 29% 567
2000 27% 30% 654
2001 30% 32% 679
2002 31% 31% 701
2003 34% 31% 838
2004 36% 31% 931
2005 34% 31% 963
2006 38% 31% 879
2007 38% 32% 959
2008 41% 32% 870
2009 40% 32% 903
Total 33% 31% 10357
Percentage of Acres Cash Rented by Year  
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Table A. 12     Number of Tillable Acres by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 963 522 421
1997 928 481 497
1998 952 507 495
1999 963 554 567
2000 966 541 654
2001 981 568 679
2002 1004 583 701
2003 1043 617 838
2004 1085 635 931
2005 1073 655 963
2006 1096 706 879
2007 1120 728 959
2008 1114 681 870
2009 1116 707 903
Total 1044 631 10357
Number of Tillable Acres by Year 
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Table A. 13     D/A Ratio by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 0.34 0.20 421
1997 0.33 0.20 496
1998 0.35 0.21 495
1999 0.33 0.21 567
2000 0.35 0.53 652
2001 0.34 0.23 678
2002 0.36 0.25 700
2003 0.34 0.22 831
2004 0.33 0.22 929
2005 0.31 0.21 963
2006 0.30 0.20 879
2007 0.27 0.18 959
2008 0.26 0.19 870
2009 0.26 0.17 903
Total 0.31 0.24 10343
Debt-to-Asset Ratio by Year  
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Table A. 14     Soil Productivity Rating by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 84 11 421
1997 84 10 497
1998 85 9 495
1999 84 10 567
2000 84 10 654
2001 84 10 679
2002 84 9 701
2003 84 9 838
2004 84 9 931
2005 84 10 963
2006 84 10 879
2007 84 9 959
2008 84 9 870
2009 83 10 903
Total 83.95 9.54 10357
Soil Productivity Rating  by Year  
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Table A. 15     Hire and Leasing Costs/ Total Power Costs by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 15% 17% 421
1997 11% 23% 497
1998 10% 12% 495
1999 12% 13% 567
2000 11% 13% 654
2001 12% 13% 679
2002 12% 14% 701
2003 14% 14% 838
2004 13% 14% 931
2005 13% 15% 963
2006 13% 15% 879
2007 13% 15% 959
2008 12% 14% 869
2009 13% 14% 903
Total 12% 15% 10356
Hire and Leasing Costs as a Percentage of Total 
Power Costs By Year 
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Table A. 16     Current Assets by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996  $     253,754  $     186,329 421
1997  $     254,350  $     205,104 497
1998  $     241,381  $     181,888 495
1999  $     247,647  $     216,425 567
2000  $     253,967  $     201,906 654
2001  $     248,271  $     194,208 679
2002  $     252,996  $     179,202 701
2003  $     282,152  $     207,138 838
2004  $     330,283  $     238,721 931
2005  $     334,472  $     243,183 963
2006  $     401,756  $     308,252 879
2007  $     569,317  $     430,591 959
2008  $     675,453  $     493,844 870
2009  $     613,141  $     444,321 903
Total  $     377,679  $     338,896 10357
Current Assets by Year  
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Table A. 17     Intermediate Assets by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996  $   299,378  $  194,851 421
1997  $   320,206  $  207,721 497
1998  $   343,476  $  219,792 495
1999  $   350,047  $  229,027 567
2000  $   359,045  $  226,741 654
2001  $   368,490  $  253,163 679
2002  $   363,532  $  221,166 701
2003  $   384,403  $  229,571 838
2004  $   437,408  $  302,828 931
2005  $   453,851  $  313,712 963
2006  $   490,324  $  351,960 879
2007  $   540,487  $  369,994 959
2008  $   572,592  $  371,772 870
2009  $   646,718  $  417,268 903
Total  $   443,315  $  318,158 10357
Intermediate Assets  by Year  
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Table A. 18     Long-Term Assets by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996  $    440,610  $   536,200 421
1997  $    467,443  $   538,420 497
1998  $    475,787  $   570,635 495
1999  $    526,124  $   678,733 567
2000  $    536,278  $   649,802 654
2001  $    592,466  $   689,928 679
2002  $    560,012  $   616,838 701
2003  $    644,815  $   767,500 838
2004  $    737,941  $   993,823 931
2005  $    791,098  $1,021,715 963
2006  $    864,441  $1,011,282 879
2007  $    997,774  $1,196,953 959
2008  $ 1,031,453  $1,098,948 870
2009  $ 1,091,875  $1,092,177 903
Total  $    742,151  $   923,677 10357
Long-Term Assets by Year  
  
138 
 
 
Table A. 19     Current Debt by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996  $     142,454  $ 115,559 421
1997  $     144,503  $ 123,308 497
1998  $     154,463  $ 128,685 495
1999  $     145,964  $ 131,078 567
2000  $     144,800  $ 130,653 654
2001  $     157,877  $ 141,981 679
2002  $     169,073  $ 149,490 701
2003  $     172,234  $ 165,671 838
2004  $     192,911  $ 188,735 931
2005  $     199,001  $ 207,940 963
2006  $     217,460  $ 225,990 879
2007  $     248,782  $ 299,058 959
2008  $     271,846  $ 275,170 870
2009  $     269,147  $ 234,248 903
Total  $     196,609  $ 205,287 10357
Current Debt by Year  
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Table A. 20     Intermediate Debt by Year APG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Pure Grain Farms 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996  $      47,322  $    54,626 421
1997  $      52,055  $    61,360 497
1998  $      51,908  $    67,149 495
1999  $      50,130  $    61,684 567
2000  $      47,370  $    56,144 654
2001  $      51,487  $    60,287 679
2002  $      53,188  $    63,448 701
2003  $      56,222  $    69,832 838
2004  $      64,857  $    82,054 931
2005  $      63,276  $    87,483 963
2006  $      68,197  $    87,912 879
2007  $      76,248  $  107,031 959
2008  $      77,113  $  109,743 870
2009  $      83,155  $  112,098 903
Total  $      62,452  $    84,254 10357
Intermediate Debt  by Year  
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Table A. 21     Regression Results ROA w/o D/A, APG 96-09 
 
Regression Results for Return on Assets Model 
All Pure Grain Farms in Illinois (1996-2009) 
Fixed Effects with Clustered Standard Errors 
F(23,2283) 96.69
Prob> F 0.00
R-Squared 
Within 0.0220
Between 0.0372
Overall 0.0228
Number of Observations 10109
Number of Groups 2284
Observation per Group 
Min 1
Average 4.4
Max 14
(Std. Err. Adjusted for 2301 clusters in farmid)
dum98 0.0050
(0.0142)
dumshare75 0.0033 dum99 0.0171
(0.0052) (0.0113)
dumshare5075 0.0045 dum00 -0.0035
(0.0041) (0.0235)
dumcash75 0.0091 dum01 0.0214
(0.0069) (0.0248)
dumcash5075 0.0071 dum02 -0.0043
(0.0046) (0.0040)
dumowned40 0.0090 dum03 0.0059
(0.0077) (0.0041)
powtotal -0.0006 *** dum04 0.0212 ***
(0.0001) (0.0042)
hireperc 0.0150 dum05 -0.0119 ***
(0.0196) (0.0040)
spr 0.0013 dum06 0.0194 ***
(0.0022) (0.0042)
hundsoftilacr 0.0047 ** dum07 0.0904 ***
(0.0022) (0.0038)
dum96 0.0915 *** dum08 0.0742 ***
(0.0175) (0.0032)
dum97 0.0411 *** constant -0.0438
(0.0060) 0.1814
Sample 10109
Note: *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Variable 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  Variable 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
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Table A. 22     Regression Results ROA w/o D/A, APG within Time Periods 
 
Regression Results for Return on Assets Model 
Pure Grain Farm's 3 Year Averages 
OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
F(9,222) F(10,344) F(10,475) 
4.10 7.93 12.60
Prob> F 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
R-Squared 0.1836 0.1843 0.1789
Root MSE 0.04 0.05 0.05
1998-2000 2002-2004 2007-2009
dumshare75 0.0194 * 0.0215 *** 0.0241 ***
(0.0108) (0.0082) (0.0074)
dumshare5075 0.0133 0.0236 *** 0.0150 **
(0.0111) (0.0087) (0.0071)
dumcash75 0.0227 0.0349 *** 0.0287 ***
(0.0138) (0.0112) (0.0086)
dumcash5075 0.0139 0.0158 * 0.0082
(0.0108) (0.0094) (0.0059)
dumowned40 0.0138 -0.0110 -0.0148 *
(0.0114) (0.0085) (0.0076)
powtotal -0.0010 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0004 ***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
hireperc 0.0286 -0.0011 -0.0180
(0.0312) (0.0211) (0.0185)
spr -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
hundsoftilacr 0.0011 * 0.0004 0.0021 ***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
constant 0.1693 *** 0.1315 *** 0.1172 ***
(0.0570) (0.0307) (0.0295)
Sample 232 355 486
Note: *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively 
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
Coefficient
(Standard Error)  
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APPENDIX B  
 
Additional Pooled Dataset Analysis  
Table B. 1     Summary Stats All Farms 96-09 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
Pooled Dataset (All Farms) 1996-2009 
ROA 10% 22%
ROE 10% 46%
nfiperacre  $         134  $        2,730 
tenureowned 21% 25%
tenurecash 33% 32%
tenureshare 46% 34%
tenureshareofrent 56% 38%
da 0.31 0.24
spr 82 11
acrtil 983 632
hireperc 13% 14%
totalassacr 3,043$      14,147$      
currassacr 682$         5,216$        
intassacr 848$         3,778$        
ltassacr 1,513$      9,830$        
totaldebtacr 894$         7,640$        
currdebtacr 397$         4,099$        
intdebtacr 103$         586$           
ltdebtacr 394$         4,403$        
Sample 14790
Mean
Standard 
Deviation 
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Table B. 2     Correlation Matrix All Farms 96-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
Pooled Dataset (All Farms) 1996-2009 
da tenureowned tenurecash tenureshareofrent spr hundsofacrtil powhireintassets hireperc
da 1
tenureowned -0.15 1
tenurecash 0.12 -0.28 1
tenureshareofrent -0.06 -0.24 -0.81 1
spr -0.04 -0.20 -0.04 0.14 1
hundsofacrtil 0.09 -0.22 0.11 0.03 0.04 1
powhireintassets 0.02 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 1
hireperc 0.04 0.09 0.13 -0.19 -0.06 -0.08 0.03 1
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Table B. 3     Summary Stats 3-yr Averages All Farms 98-00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics of 3-Year Averages 
Pooled Dataset (All Farms) 1998-2000 
ROA 8% 5%
ROE 6% 8%
nfiperacre  $         61.79  $          68.82 
tenureowned 18% 22%
tenurecash 25% 29%
tenureshare 57% 32%
tenureshareofrent 67% 35%
da 0.31 0.19
spr 84 10
acrtil 926 525
hireperc 10% 10%
totalassacr 2,032$          1,585$          
currassacr 444$             572$             
intassacr 670$             471$             
ltassacr 918$             1,007$          
totaldebtacr 533$             613$             
currdebtacr 231$             171$             
intdebtacr 88$               143$             
ltdebtacr 213$             393$             
Sample 390
Mean
Standard 
Deviation 
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Table B. 4     Correlation Matrix, All Farms 98-00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
Pooled Dataset (All Farms) 1998-2000 
da tenureowned tenurecash tenureshareofrent spr hundsofacrtil powhireintassets hireperc
da 1
tenureowned -0.23 1
tenurecash 0.24 -0.20 1
tenureshareofrent -0.16 -0.21 -0.86 1
spr -0.07 -0.16 -0.04 0.11 1
hundsofacrtil 0.16 -0.14 0.03 0.04 0.07 1
powhireintassets -0.24 0.42 -0.08 -0.16 -0.12 -0.31 1
hireperc 0.14 0.04 0.23 -0.27 -0.09 0.02 -0.03 1
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Table B. 5     Summary Stats 3-yr Averages All Farms 02-04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics of 3-Year Averages 
Pooled Dataset (All Farms) 2002-2004 
ROA 9% 6%
ROE 10% 35%
nfiperacre  $          201  $       2,262 
tenureowned 20% 24%
tenurecash 32% 30%
tenureshare 48% 33%
tenureshareofrent 57% 37%
da 0.34 0.21
spr 82 10
acrtil 1001 554
hireperc 13% 13%
totalassacr 2,816$       15,254$     
currassacr 698$          5,785$       
intassacr 956$          7,100$       
ltassacr 1,162$       2,799$       
totaldebtacr 1,364$       17,644$     
currdebtacr 614$          8,390$       
intdebtacr 114$          678$          
ltdebtacr 637$          8,599$       
Sample 558
Mean
Standard 
Deviation 
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Table B. 6     Correlation Matrix, All Farms 02-04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
Pooled Dataset (All Farms) 2002-2004 
da tenureowned tenurecash tenureshareofrent spr hundsofacrtil powhireintassets hireperc
da 1
tenureowned -0.23 1
tenurecash 0.23 -0.28 1
tenureshareofrent -0.15 -0.20 -0.83 1
spr 0.00 -0.19 -0.03 0.13 1
hundsofacrtil 0.15 -0.24 0.08 0.05 -0.01 1
powhireintassets 0.15 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.11 1
hireperc 0.14 0.07 0.16 -0.23 -0.07 -0.13 0.11 1
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Table B. 7     Summary Stats 3-yr Averages All Farms 07-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics of 3-Year Averages 
Pooled Dataset (All Farms) 2007-2009 
ROA 12% 6%
ROE 13% 9%
nfiperacre  $          222  $             91 
tenureowned 20% 24%
tenurecash 39% 32%
tenureshare 40% 33%
tenureshareofrent 48% 37%
da 0.25 0.16
spr 82.3 10.5
acrtil 1057.3 643.2
hireperc 14% 14%
totalassacr 3,093$        2,209$        
currassacr 774$           402$           
intassacr 821$           570$           
ltassacr 1,498$        1,729$        
totaldebtacr 637$           505$           
currdebtacr 300$           203$           
intdebtacr 84$             90$             
ltdebtacr 254$           355$           
Sample 695
Mean
Standard 
Deviation 
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Table B. 8     Correlation Matrix, All Farms 07-09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
Pooled Dataset (All Farms) 2007-2009 
da tenureowned tenurecash tenureshareofrent spr hundsofacrtil powhireintassets hireperc
da 1
tenureowned -0.20 1
tenurecash 0.22 -0.32 1
tenureshareofrent -0.13 -0.21 -0.81 1
spr -0.10 -0.22 -0.05 0.18 1
hundsofacrtil 0.13 -0.23 0.07 0.06 0.08 1
powhireintassets -0.18 0.37 -0.05 -0.17 -0.08 -0.30 1
hireperc 0.00 0.15 0.13 -0.22 -0.10 -0.17  1
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Table B. 9     NFI/ac. by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996  $            171  $           255 715
1997  $            355  $        7,192 817
1998  $          (432)  $        7,349 780
1999  $              74  $           240 893
2000  $              82  $           292 969
2001  $            116  $        2,764 1041
2002  $              29  $        1,889 962
2003  $            107  $           295 1213
2004  $            175  $        1,014 1303
2005  $            199  $        2,968 1306
2006  $            169  $           807 1207
2007  $            280  $           125 1249
2008  $            263  $           132 1176
2009  $            110  $           293 1177
Total  $            134  $        2,726 14808
Net Farm Income /acre by Year  
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Table B. 10     ROA by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 16% 11% 715
1997 11% 10% 816
1998 6% 7% 780
1999 8% 7% 895
2000 8% 60% 966
2001 9% 49% 1040
2002 -13% 620% 961
2003 10% 7% 1209
2004 11% 9% 1302
2005 8% 7% 1306
2006 11% 7% 1207
2007 16% 10% 1247
2008 14% 9% 1169
2009 7% 6% 866
Total 9% 161% 14479
Return on Assets by Year  
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Table B. 11     ROE by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 18% 39% 715
1997 13% 31% 816
1998 0% 32% 780
1999 7% 19% 895
2000 10% 17% 966
2001 5% 35% 1040
2002 5% 31% 961
2003 11% 37% 1209
2004 12% 44% 1302
2005 5% 78% 1306
2006 9% 103% 1207
2007 19% 20% 1247
2008 16% 18% 1176
2009 5% 14% 1176
Total 10% 46% 14796
Return on Equity by Year  
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Table B. 12     Share Leased % by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation Sample Size 
1996 58% 34% 715
1997 56% 34% 818
1998 56% 35% 780
1999 54% 34% 895
2000 53% 34% 970
2001 47% 35% 1056
2002 49% 34% 962
2003 46% 34% 1217
2004 43% 34% 1303
2005 44% 34% 1306
2006 42% 33% 1207
2007 41% 34% 1249
2008 39% 33% 1176
2009 39% 33% 1177
Total 46% 34% 14831
Percentage of Acres Share Leased by Year  
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Table B. 13     Cash Rented % by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation Sample Size 
1996 23% 28% 715
1997 24% 29% 818
1998 24% 29% 780
1999 26% 29% 895
2000 27% 29% 970
2001 30% 31% 1057
2002 31% 31% 962
2003 33% 32% 1217
2004 36% 32% 1303
2005 35% 31% 1306
2006 37% 32% 1207
2007 38% 32% 1249
2008 39% 33% 1176
2009 40% 32% 1177
Total 33% 32% 14832
Percentage of Acres Cash Rented by Year  
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Table B. 14     Acres Owned % by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation Sample Size 
1996 19% 24% 715
1997 20% 24% 818
1998 20% 25% 780
1999 21% 25% 895
2000 21% 25% 970
2001 22% 26% 1057
2002 20% 25% 962
2003 21% 25% 1217
2004 21% 25% 1303
2005 21% 25% 1306
2006 21% 25% 1207
2007 21% 25% 1249
2008 21% 25% 1176
2009 21% 25% 1177
Total 21% 25% 14832
Percent of Acres Owned by Year  
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Table B. 15    Number of Tillable Acres by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation Sample Size 
1996 865 518 715
1997 855 506 818
1998 874 514 780
1999 906 559 895
2000 918 556 970
2001 908 586 1057
2002 949 580 962
2003 1000 624 1217
2004 1035 639 1303
2005 1026 665 1306
2006 1048 685 1207
2007 1066 728 1249
2008 1067 692 1176
2009 1062 708 1177
Total 983 632 14832
Number of Tillable Acres by Year 
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Table B. 16     D/A by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation
Sample 
Size 
1996 0.34 0.22 715
1997 0.33 0.21 816
1998 0.34 0.22 780
1999 0.33 0.21 895
2000 0.34 0.45 965
2001 0.35 0.25 1040
2002 0.36 0.25 960
2003 0.34 0.23 1209
2004 0.32 0.22 1301
2005 0.31 0.21 1306
2006 0.30 0.20 1207
2007 0.27 0.19 1247
2008 0.26 0.18 1176
2009 0.26 0.18 1175
Total 0.31 0.24 14792
Debt-to-Asset Ratio by Year  
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Table B. 17     Soil Productivity Rating by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation Sample Size 
1996 81 12 715
1997 82 12 818
1998 83 11 780
1999 82 11 895
2000 82 11 970
2001 81 15 1057
2002 82 11 962
2003 81 11 1217
2004 82 11 1303
2005 82 11 1306
2006 82 11 1207
2007 82 11 1249
2008 82 11 1176
2009 82 11 1177
Total 82 11 14832
Soil Productivity Rating  by Year  
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Table B. 18     Hire and Leasing Costs/ Total Power Costs by Year All Farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pooled Dataset 
Year Mean
Standard
Deviation Sample Size 
1996 16% 17% 713
1997 12% 20% 815
1998 10% 12% 779
1999 12% 13% 892
2000 12% 13% 968
2001 12% 13% 1041
2002 13% 14% 962
2003 14% 14% 1212
2004 14% 14% 1302
2005 13% 15% 1304
2006 13% 15% 1205
2007 13% 15% 1248
2008 13% 15% 1175
2009 13% 14% 1177
Total 13% 15% 14793
Hire and Leasing Costs as a Percentage of 
Total Power Costs By Year 
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